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PREFATORY NOTE. 
This thesis should be read in the same manner as an 
impatient novel-reader peruses fiction. The last cltapter 
ought to be read both first and last. Economy of space 
alone forbids us to print it twice. After reading the sum-
mary, those philologically inclined will find more of interest 
to themselves in the latter half of the thesis. 
The tabulated "analyses" and "summaries" , found gener-
ally at the end of the chapters, will give a comprehensive 
conception of the system, and are hence the most important 
parts of the text. 
• 
J\ RT I. 
SY:\IHOL ,\ , f) ~IF.\ I .(,, 
'H PTER I. 
T11E \ ORLD 01· P1u:. i: r.\TIO · .... . 
lntroductory.-The fate of grammar has been a p ·culiar 
one, for it i. at once one of the most advanced and favored 
sciences, and one of the most neglected and chilo ic. To 
this result several causes co-operate, of which the folio\\ ing. 
perhaps, are the most important. The mod •rn t 'ncl ncy 1s 
to make all research historical re earch, and to r due all 
knowledge to hi tory. \\"ere it not such a \\om out c m-
monplace, we should have said: II modern study i tudy 
of evolution. But the very fact that thi i. a commonplace 
in all science hows how it over ·hadow. mod rn thought 
Philology has proved a most fruitful field for hi orical 
study, and the enthusiasm of the :tudent ha pr ved ef]ual 
to the magnitude of his ta ·k. The hi tory of the phone ic 
elements of language has. been traced back for c ntum: 
with an acutene s and patience that i astoni hing. 'I he 
physiological production and evolution of articulate ound 
has been closely investigated. The hi ·tory of every ending 
in declensions and conjuga ion· has been carefully unfolded, 
and we are informed of the hi ·torical route by which 
complex constructions ha\·e come from ·impler. But the 
10 
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very success of the historical method has blinded men to 
its limitations, and they have forgotten that showing how a 
thing arose does not decide what it is. The history 0 ~ a 
development is not its philosophy. The order in which 
phenomena have arisen does not give the rational ground of \ 
any one phenomenon in the succession. By its very nature 
it i de criptive. This is overlooked, so that the same 
cienti t \\ho would look with pharisaical horror at a litt~e 
hi torical inexactness, complacently uses a terminology in 
yntax and inAection that implies the gravest contradicti~n s 
in hi philo ophy of the sentence. He speaks of an Engli sh 
pa ive voice, confounds predication and assertion, and even 
cla e auxiliaries among connectives. Another source of 
thi neglect of the philosophical principles of grammar 
in the modern tendency to make all science natural 
cience, and to con ider natural equivalent to physical. 
Hence, philology has come to mean chiefly phonet ics with 
a clo e alliance a possible to the physiology of the speech 
organ . Take as an example Cook's Siever's Old English 
Grammar. This excellent and standard work has almost no 
yn ax and nothing but the traditional tables of conjugations 
and declen ion in addition to its very voluminous historical 
phonetic . , till it is called a grammar; and this is a typical 
cxampl of the mo t modern work in that science. 
f late a more phi lo ophical tendency has made itse lf 
manife. tin the field of philology. But even in such books 
a we t' ''.'cw English Grammar," and Paul's "Principles 
of .L nguage," the purely philosophical portion is treated 
a if of econdary importance; and hence the old saws of the 
choolm n and the as umptions of modern scientists are 
un }' cmatically jumbled together and uncritically accepted 
a the very tarting-points and foundations of the science; 
and .o it i till true that logic and psychology are neglected 
for hi lory, physics and physiology in the study of grammar. 
ur present purpose is to do what we can in this neglected field of inquiry. 
B~fore ~ve enter upon our task, it may be well to preface 
the d1 c~s ion in this chapter by an explanation. As this 
chapter is to lay the foundation, it is necessary to treat of 
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some conceptions of psychology, and the writer has con-
stantly been in doubt as to what should be stated and what 
left to be understood. Even \\here there is practically no 
dispute among modern psychologists, it seemed sometimes 
necessary for the sake of symmetry to mention and develop 
the principle naturally in the shortest manner possible. 
-econdly, it happens that no two psychologists agree as to 
\\hat are the setth:d principles of modern psychology. In 
the main any t\\O generally agree on the list of settled 
principles\\ 1th but one or two pct provisos: but the sum of 
all pet heresies forms probably just as large and just as 
fundamental a body of principles as the catholic canon of 
the ·cience. Hence when doubtful \\ hether a doctrine 
germane to the di cussion i.; g nerally accepted or not, \\e 
have taken the benefit ol the doubt and ha\ c briefly ex-
plained our position. 
Tiu prcsmlatio11-<.vorld as disti11J{11islt.-d from tltc «onuptual 
·world. Consciousness can be dichotomized into a presen-
tation-world and a world of meaning. Equivalent divisions 
of the contents of con ·ciou ·ness arc too ~\·ell known to need 
mention here The Kantian sense-world is an example of 
the first. But a ft:\\ philosophical distinctions have been 
more seriously mi sunder tood than thi · division of the 
known world into a :-.ense-world on the one hand and an 
intelligible world, or a world of meaning, on the other, 1t 
may be well to pause a moment over the difference bct\\een 
them. 
The object of knowledge may be divided into fdt H·orld 
and undtrstood ·world. or pNsoila/1011- < •orld 1111d <corld of 
mct111i11g. These divisions are equivalent. 
The presentation-world is the object of knowledge a· it 
is presmtcd to us; that is, as it is "1111con ciou:ly" or rather 
im.•obmtarily con trued by the perceptive' faculty. It con-
si ·ts of perceptions qua perceptions. It is that \\hich is 
heard, seen, felt, imagined, and remembered, ju t as it i · 
heard, seen, felt, imagined, and remembered, ithout any 
additional content derived from voluntary or explicit 
"conscious" reflection on the!>e phenomena. A few illus-
trations will perhaps "force the reader to under tand" the 
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distinction. If a straight stick is partly immersed at a~ 
oblique angle in water, we say it appears crooked but is 
straight. The crooked appearance belongs to the sense-
world, the knowledge that it is still a straight stick belongs 
to the conceptual world. Now, if the stick is withdr~wn 
from the water, it will appear as well as be a straight stick· 
We say now that the appearance is true; but we must .not 
lose sight of the fact that the visual percept of the stick, 
whether straight or crooked, whether false or true, qua per-
cept, is still nothing but an appearance, and as such belongs 
to the presentation-world. The sun as an object in my pre-
sentation-world is about as large as a dinner plate. As a 
presentation it is no larger than it appears; for an appear-
ance as an appearance, can be nothing but what it appears 
to be. This is a truism almost too trivial to repeat . How-
ever, it is certain that after taking into account the whole of 
my own and parts of other men's experience, I must inter-
pret the bright, circular disk in the sky to mean an immens_e 
spherical body a million times the size of the earth. This 
is, however, conceptual knowledge, not sense (or presenta-
tion) knowledge at all; for I can neither see nor imagine a 
body a million times larger than the earth, if we consider 
size as something absolute. In the conceptual world 
parallel Ii nes never meet, in the presentation-world they do 
meet at the horizon. Space as conceived is infinite, space 
as perceived is limited on all sides; when not by an opaque bod~, by the vault of the sky. The very concept of time 
denies that time has beginning or end* but time as "per-
ceived " · · d · ' t 
' 
1mag10e 10 the future or remembered in the pas ' • r • I 1 imited both ex parte ante et ex parte post. As an exam pie, ~ake the "third dimension" of space. Many harbor a lurk-
10g or op · · · 
en susp1c1on that we do not possess this dimens10n b th . . 
Y e same warranty deed as the other two. For do ~e 
not construct this dimension, and that from spatial data of 
only. two dimensions? This confusion comes from not ~ng a distinction between the "conscious" and "uncon-
•or. W. T . Harris• · a· . ce 
as against tbe Hamilt vii:i •cation of the truth of the infinity of time and sp~ e' !fen~e we state witbou0t;ant~heory of the conditioned, seems to us co~clua':r~ 
•nfinite, and refer poss'bl urb' er argument that time and space as conceive 
' e o ~ectors to Mr. Harris. 
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scious" constructions of the mind, the "judgment," if it may 
so be called, by which a percept is construed, and the ex-
plicit judgment. All perception is construction. The per-
ceiving mind arranges and interprets that which i given in 
sensation into a sense-cosmos, and only as it is thus arranged 
are we conscious of the sense-world. But this arranging and 
interpreting is done implicitly and involuntarily, and it ap-
pears to us as if the sense-world, or, more exactly. the pre-
sentation-world, were given to us just as it exists, a cosmos 
in time and space. rot only the third dimension in sight-
perception, but the other two dimensions also, as \\ell as 
the percepts of the other senses and the images of imagina-
tion, are in the same sense construed by what ''e call apper-
ception. Apperceptii!e inference is therefore included in the 
presentation-<t'orld, while explicit interpretation belongs to 
the conceptual world. Our perceptions of the third dimen-
ion are imperfect, but not wanting. foot's distance at 
right angle to the horizon on the plane of the horizon . eem · 
shorter tht farther it is from the eye, but still it seems of 
some length. \ e do not judge simply, we sL"L" the di.tance. 
For our pre ent purpose the interest in the dichotomy 
of the contents of consciousness into . cnse and undcrstan<'-
ing, pre entation-world and conccpt-\\Orld, centre· almost 
exclusively in the former of these divisions. This may be 
summed up thu : 
The presentation-world i · the world of appearance·; it i 
the content of our con ciou nes so ·far as presented to us 
by the activities of our cnses and the imagination. The 
presentation-world is not the sensations merely, for they 
form no world (no unified experience) as mere sen ations; 
but it i the cosmo of p.-rccptio11. Hence it doe not exclude 
the "unconsciou inference " implied in apperception. All 
explicit judgment about the object of this world i · con ·e-
quently excluded. The thesi of the present ·cction can be 
held alike by realist and idealist. o anc man believes 
that a tick ne"Ce. aril)' is bent when it appear· o. 
Tile unity of t/u· prcsmlatio11-world.-Prt'St'1tltllio11 i · here 
used a a common name for percepts and image , in hart, 
for all that appears to us under the forms of time and 
~~-----------------------
SYMBOL AND MEANING. 
space. Hence the presentation-world includes, first o~ all, 
the sense-world in the stricter sense. All that is perceived 
by the" five senses," the temperature sense, muscular sense, 
and "organic" senses, is, considered as percept simply, pre-
entation. The images by which memory recalls the P.ast, 
and the images voluntarily constructed by the imagination, 
and without our will by the phantasy in reverie or dreams, 
arc al o here cla sed as presentations. In this paragraph 
we hall attempt to show that there is no intrinsic difference 
between images and percepts ; also, that all presentations 
are member· of one world whose bonds of union are time 
and space. 
Fir t, the tactual and visual worlds coincide; we have the 
ame time and space in touch as in vision. The object felt 
under the table is located in the same space-continuum as 
the object seen above it. This is probably admitted by all. 
Hearing is sometimes asserted to be a time-sense, but 
n.ot a space-sense. This may be true, with some qualifica-
tion · A being without sight and touch and with only one ea~ might perhaps have absolutely no space perception. 
ll1. consciousness would have the time-form only, and it is 
altogether impo ·sible for us to imagine his world; but for 
one\ ho po·sc·ses either touch or sight, sounds are located 
pontaneou. ly, and as far as we can know from the begin-
n'.ng .. 'ound not only appears to com~ from a certain 
d1r 'Ct1on but al· f · d · 
• so rom a more or less defi111te 1stance. , . . 
or 1 it ncces ary to bring in any explicit judgment to locate ound · f ti . 
• or ley appear by appercept1on, far or near, 
a.tor west. ense, not understanding locates sound where it ap1>car to be Th' b . ' 
· is can e plainly shown to be the case when en ·e and d · f I 
un erstandrng disagree. The sound o tie church-bells ee . t . 
h ms o come directly from the south because t c open w· d f 
I 111 ow o the room is in that direction from the 1 lencr and ti 
f ' le sound may continue to appear to come rom the south 'f 
I even 1 the listener knows that the bells are 0 l 1e ca t of h · I 
f im. f sounu were incapable of the space-orm, not only ·h Id . 
would be. s. ou we not continually locate it, but it 
impos ible ever to locate it. 
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Taste and smell have been called subjective senses void 
of spatial perception. If the question were whether a being 
with only taste and smell could develop his space percep-
tion, it might be true; but with this question we have noth-
ing to do. Tastes and smells, however, perceived by persons 
that have also the sense of touch are always located in the 
nose and mouth. obody ever located the taste of sugar 
or the odor of violets in his finger. 
The same line of reasoning can be applied to the tem-
perature sense, the muscular sense, and the senses of organic 
condition. These senses may be more or Jess vague, but so 
much at least is certain, that they indubitably refer the 
feeling to some space object, if not more definitely, to our 
\\hole body. \Ve are in no doubt when hungry as to whose 
stomach is in need, or when sea-sick as to who e head and 
general system is in unstable equilibrium. Therefore we 
can safely conclude that the world of sen e-perception i 
one, spatial, and finite. 
But to the world of ense-perception should be added 
the world of memory and imagination. As a common name 
for the products, or contents, of memory and imagination we 
shall use the term image . A to the condition of their 
production, images arc, and sense-percepts are not, inde-
pendent of outer sen e organ ; but as presentations, images 
differ from sense-percepts only in degree and not alway · in 
that. It may be objected, that in such a case we might 
mistake images for percept:. The answer is: \\'e often do. 
\ ho has not sometimes when listening to the dying strain 
of an organ, been in doubt as to when the organ topped 
and imagination began? The pioneer's boy knows by sad 
experience how hard it is to tell whether he hears or ima-
gines he hears the cow-bell in the forest. i\Iany a gho t 
story is a testimony to the ea ·e with '' hich an image plays 
the role of a visual percept. This theory, ho\ ever, is 
fraught with what seems at first awful consequence . It 
forces us to believe that an imagination "idea" of red is a 
red "idea", and that an imagination idea of extension i an 
•Ree against lhi'.lt ,•icw "Lotze•.,. Outlin~ of Psychology, tranctlated hJ Lad<1, 
p. 33, also p. :.!8 . 
~~-------------------.. 
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extended idea.* Fir~t, however, we must know that pro-
perly speaking we can not be said to have either images or 
percept of mere extension or mere color. The nearest we 
can come to this is to have an image or percept of an ex-
tended or a colored thing. But the image is as extend.ed 
· · b1ect and colored as th e percept. Plainly, the imagrnrng su ~ t 
need not be ex tended and colored any more than the sub1ec 
a· perceiving is, and the act of imagination any more than 
the act of perception. But the important thing to hold fast 
fc.r our present purpose is the fact that the redness of a 
color, the pitch of a sound, and the dimensions of a figure 
arc of the same nature in the image as in the percept. Th e re 
are not two blue colors, one imagined and one perceived. 
Every night that we dream, this is proved true. Do we not 
in dreams walk abo ut in what we take for broad daylight 
among hapes that we take for percepts? The following 
experiment can be tried by anyone: After retiring, when 
the mind 1 ·no longer busy with active interests, close tl:e 
eyes and concen trate the attention on one of the floating 
· hape of imagination that then troop past the mind. Soon 
it will be hard to distinguish thi s product of the imagination 
from the ll(Jating coruscations of light always seen in the f~n?u· .of the eye; and with more persistent attention, the 
•milanty lo a perception will be so startling as almost to 
ugoest something uncanny. Goet he's seeing a flower grow 
out of a flower, and the painter's remembering his model 
perceptually are extreme examples in point; but there are 
none amon~ us that have not often in sleep, and not seldom ~unng their waking hours been betrayed into taking an 
im gc for a percept, The image crosses the boundary to 
the percept simply because there is no boundary to cross; 
for, \\hile the production (process) of imagination is radically 
different from that of perception, one being bound to outer 
·en e or"an · tl1e otl · I · 
h : • ler not, one being partly voluntary, tic 0 her. practically not, the products (results) differ, if at all, 
only 111 the deO' f · · d 
I .,ree o v1v1<lness. The images are referre to 1c ·ame . · . 
_ ·pace a the percepts. The European immigrant 
•in the e cntcnces ~ h . 
""""" ofunaRe ofim~ ;~rt. e first and last time, we use the word "idea" 10. the 
to the \\urd, but Whic~ ,:~i"-'".and memory, a sense that never should be given 
1 is imposed upon it even by careful writers. 
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to America, when he lets his fancy reconstruct the scenes of 
his childhood, always locates them in the east; if on a jour-
ney we awaken in the night and think of our home, and then 
suddenly remember that we are in quite another direction 
from home than at first we supposed, we find that the whole 
cenery of imagination veers around so as to tally with geo-
graphy. If imagined space were one affair and perceived 
space another, it could not make any conceivable difference 
where the person of the imaginer were located. Imagina-
tion has not a stage of its own where distance and direc-
tions are wholly arbitrary and independent of perceived 
space. It is well known to every psychologist that percep-
tion and imagination can in no wise be separated. Jn \\hat 
we name a percept, we generally imagine more than \\e see, 
hear, or feel, as the whole subject of apperception teaches. 
Of a friend's face, a page of reading in a familiar language, 
and of any other well known object, very little of \\hat is 
perceived is seen, the greater part is an image gathered 
from hundreds of previous perceptions. If the images of 
recollection and imagination were of different nature or 
located in a different space-continuum than the percept, 
such co-operation as that which takes place in apperception 
would be impossible. 
Our conclusion is therefore this: !~ages and percepts 
con idered as presentations differ in degree only; are 
spatial, and all located in the ame space-continuum. Thus 
there is but one space for the mind. That there is but one 
time for the mind may be taken for granted. 
V. e have now attempted to show the unity and homo-
geneity of the presentation-world. This world is in time 
and space, and in but one time and one space. Presenta-
tions qua presentations differ in nothing essential, whether 
they be images or percepts. Ilence when, in the following 
pages, we lay do\\ n the la\\ s of symboli ·m, we sltall need to 
make 110 distlllctio11 ber&ccn prcsc11talio11s. 
-
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CHAPTER II. 
SYMBOL AND THOUGHT. 
Objectification.-The rational mind places the content of 
its consciousness ovc1 against itself as another to its Self, 
and thus its sensation becomes intuition, becomes an object 
of knowledge. Before the content of consciousness can be 
discriminated and synthesized into a world, it must b~ thus 
distinguished from the knower and still kept in relation to 
him; it must be objectified, placed over against the ego ~s 
that which is not the ego, but which still belongs to it. 
This is objectification. Hence it comes to pass that though 
consciousness knows itself primarily and immediately, yet 
a oon as the ego thinks an articulate thought, forms a 
judgment about itself, it must first make itself into its Other, 
think the ego as the non-ego; for before the subject becomes 
an object of thought, it can not be handled by our faculty 
of discursive reason. The procedure is similar when th e 
object of thought is one of the past states of consciousness. 
To be an object of thought the state can not be thought of 
purely as a state of the subject, but as something not-me 
placed over again t the subject. This truth has been disre-
garded by many psychologists, and as a consequence they 
have sooner or later awakened in wonder and amazement 
to the fact that the self has mysteriously but irretrievably b~en lost in their ·y terns. They started out to philosophize 
\ 1th entire faith in the common-sense belief that the self, 
after all, is the most important thing about psychology, but 
af:e.r a ."scientific investigation" they could find no self. 
\\ ~ich i:; true enough; for to know scientifically we must 
ob1ectify our knowledge, and hence in thus knowing the self 
\ ·e .mu t first make it another than the subject, an object. 
Thi other into which all knowledge must be translated is , 
a· a Ymbol, in time and space. ot that we may not know 
t?at certain realities of which we have knowledge transcend 
ttme and s b l' · 
. pace, ut only that we can not know these rea 1ties e~cept 111 and through a space and time symbol. We still 
picture the soul as warm air, like the Stoics, or as a human 
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figure with wing , like the Greek sculptors; and this in spite 
of the non-spatial doctrines \\e may hold about the conscious 
principle. Again, \\ar i" a grim soldier, a uniformed army, 
smoking cannon, devastated fields, or something else sym-
bolic and pictorial, though the thinker knows full well that 
the ab tract and collectin: noun in question me~ns both 
more and less than any of the ·e images. Thought is mate-
rialistic ; its symbols move in time and space only. All 
joining of thought to thought, all movement, in one word, 
in the realm of thought, is clone symbolically in a "material-
istic" manner, by joining one presentation to another, and 
pre ·cntations, as we have seen, are spatial and tern poral. 
Jh·a11i11g and symbol arc insl'parable and still meaning is not 
S)'l1Tbol. - The presentation-world as such i · a ymbol and a 
symbol only. "For logical purpose· ideas are symbol and 
they are nothing but symbol"', :ays F. H. Bradley*; but 
this is only one-half the truth. The other half i. this: 
;\leaning i · found in symbols and in ymbols only. n 
illustration may make our point clear. \\'e ay and think: 
the cause of the billiard ball 's mo ing 1 · the impact from 
the cue. How do we think this? \\'hat happen in our 
consciousness \\hen we say we understand it? ;\ ball and a 
cue are imagined, the ball at re t and the cue in motion; 
next the ball and the cue collide, and the ball begin to 
move. All this mu t be imagined; and conver ely, thi · i 
all that can be imagined of the causal relation of the cue' 
motion to the ball's. All the pre entation-world can deliver 
in the case i · that the ball was at rest and began to move 
immediately upon contact with the cue; there is in thi not 
the least germ of causality, for causality can not be een. 
The presentation-world, as II ume abundantly proved, knO\\ 
only succe-. ion where cau ality is affirmed. But though 
causality can not be pictured, no one can doubt that it 
exists as a concept. Hence it is plain that the meaning i 
not the symbol, and in thi ca e at lea t, not even a part of 
the symbol. But if this is the ca c, why should not the 
philo::.ophic mind, at lea. t, think causality pure, that is, 
•p, II . Bradley, The Principles ol Lo!ric. p. 3 . "Iden" •< ru~ to be with 
Bradley, as witb most other lingll h writ<N, n word that has a number of 
meanings. Herc it means presentation. 
~~-----------------~ 
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without the picture gallery of imagination? Sim ply because 
it can not. This can be shown in many ways. We fi_rst 
become conscious of causality by perceiving some successi~n 
involving it; never by "pure" thought. When we explain 
to another what is meant by causality, it is always by an 
example of cause and effect. Examples can, from the nature 
of the case, come only from the presentation-world. Even 
the . trictest definition involves a presentation symbol, and 
we can not "make it clear" to ourselves what we mean by 
the word without having recourse to an example from the 
presentation-world. Therefore: no meaning witlzout symbol, 
but meaning is not symbol. This is the truth there is in the 
principle: Niltil est in intellectu quod non ante fuerit in sem71 . 
Through sense and its equivalent, imagination, all the con-
tent o[ the intellect are known· ; but, strictly speaking, the 
meaning always belonged to the intellect, and was never 
imported from the senses. Hence the Leibnitzian proviso, 
isi ipse i11teltectus, should be given its full force. 
An example illustrating symbol and meaning may be of 
u e. Let us ask how the astronomer thinks the solar 
s:stern. What are the psychoses corresponding to words 
like the following? The diameter of the sun is ten times 
that of Jupiter. The diameter of Jupiter is ten times that of 
the earth. The orbit of Jupiter is an ellipse, lying outside 
of the earth' orbit, and a revolution in it is completed in 
t\\elve year,,. The astronomer and his listener, in order to 
under·tand these sentences, must imagine (a) a fiery sphere 
?[any convenient size for the sun, (b) another partly glow-
ing ·phere of one-tenth the diameter of the former for 
Jupit_er, (c a third sphere, for the earth, having the same 
relations and size to Jupiter as he has to the sun, (d) these 
latter sph b Tl · · 
cres must c set moving around the first. 11 s 
would be t_he symbolism of the thought, and is a purely 
·pace and time affair, consisting as it does of presentations 
only B t J ' ' . f · u t iesc symbols are never for a moment mistaken 
_or t_he meaning by a rational and trained mind. This 
imagined fiery b II · · 'Th 
. . a zs not the sun, but stands for 1l. • c P ych1c image is b I · · Th f t h · a sym o of the independent reality. e ac t at the im · d . 
agine sun may be but a foot in diameter, 
• 
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that the orbit of Jupiter may be but a quarter of a mile in 
length, that the t\\elvc years of the revolution are imagined 
in a fraction of a second, arc not referred to the meaning. 
The meaning lies in the proportions and qualitative charac-
teristics only of the symbols, not in their absolute sizes, 
distances, and durations. The spatial is but the symbol. 
The reasoning in geometry presents such a typical \'aricty 
of symbolism that a specimen may well be examined. "The 
sum of the interior angles of a triangle equals two right 
angles." In satisfying himself of the truth of this propo·i-
tion the geometer uses as a symbol an imagined or percei\'ed 
particular triangle. All the partiodaril)• of the symbol, the 
length of the lines, size of the angles, the color of the 
urface and border of the triangle and its position in time 
and space is neglected; but the symbol a a presentation 
consists of nothing but particularities, hence, in a sense, the 
\\hole symbol as a presentation is neglected, uut in and 
through these particularities the universal meaning is krHl\\ n 
and held fast before the mind. The two fundamental truths 
of symbolism come out forcibly in the ca. c of the geometer; 
for, (a) the white-bordered triangle on the blackboard that 
existed for the ·pace of ten minutes is not the triangle meant 
in the proposition; tlu symbol is 1101 !ILL' mm11i11g: (b) "There 
is no royal road to mathematic:," said the old master; onl} 
through the careful obscr\'ation of the presentation-triangle 
can our con ciousncss disco\'cr and know the laws and con-
cept of the triangle ; tilt' 111ta11i11g is /.:11ow11 thr011l{lt a 
symbvl oH.lj•. 1 'otice that the meaning is always a concept. 
In the region of higher truths the distinction bet\\een 
symbol and meaning becomes still more apparent, while the 
neces ity of a symbol doe. not grow le ·s. The ca e of 
causality, with which we began, shows this. The "pure 
thought" of Hegel ha it· . ymbolic pre entation - ac-
companiment, which, however meager it may be, 'i still 
nece sary. To me, at lea t, the "return 10 it elf" is 
symbolized by something very much like a fi h-hook; and 
when it is said that a conception "sclzliigt in st'incm Gcgensat:; 
'Uber," I see two parallel walls of which the one falls over so 
as to rest on its opposite. \Vithout this pictorial furniture 
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of the mind, it would be impossible fo r me to hold fast and 
connect the principles of th e system. 
T. H. Green, in his criticism of Herbert Spencer, ex-
presses the hope (as it seems, with some misgivi ngs) th~t 
the latter philosopher does not conceive of the mind 1?, 
relation to the world as a "little box inside a big box. 
And yet there is reason to presume that Green himself, in 
company with all other ancient and modern philosophers, 
every day used some equivalent symbol to denote the 
relation of consciousness to the world. In our every day 
rea oning, do we not think of every man's consciousness as 
existing somewhere inside of his skull? But this pledges no 
one to materialism, for it may and ought to be but a symbol 
of the relation, and not the symbol that is used when ~x~c t 
thought is required. Descartes' theorv of the soul as sittmg 
astride the conarion and there as ;t a central switching 
tation, directing the forces of tl~e body, was to him and his 
chool the concept of the relation of mind and body ; to us a 
presentation involving this relation may very well be used as 
a symbol of the connection of the mind and the world, 
without binding us to this meaning. / 
Ma! not meaning, or t!te colllept, be a part of tlte symb~l · 
That .m the case of such higher concepts as causality, 
consciousness, and personality, the meaning is not, properly 
peaking, a part of the symbol, seems too apparent to need 
any further elucidation; but it may be supposed that in the 
case~ where the meaning is the genus and the symbol a 
pecimen of the genus, the case is different . That is to say, 
the seen triangle, drawn with chalk on the blackboard, some-ho\~ contains as a part of itself the conceptual triangle about 
which the mathematician reasons. This view rests either ~n a faulty use of language, or a superficial view of the case 
in hand A . d has 
· s a representation the triangle on the boar 
no concept about 't · · one f 1 ; a stroke of the eraser and 1t 1s g 
horever. But this does not affect the con~ept at all. The 
ere Y that the concept is any sort of a picture, must be 
carefully gua d d . e 
. r e agamst; and it is easy to see that a pr -entat1on can t . t 
The r . no con tam as a part of itself the concep · 
p esentat1on-symbol may be wholly changed without 
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entailing any change in the concept-meaning. Instead of a 
scalene triangle of chalk on a board, an isosceles triangle in 
imagination may be substituted, and still the meaning 
remains the same. The concept man is not the presentation 
a man minus length, color of hair, complexion, manner of 
dres , form of features, and position. For, abstract from all • 
this, if po ible, and still what is left is but fragment of a 
psychic image, an event in the thinker's imagination, some-
thing particular and arbitrary; while the concept man is not 
a psychic image at all, nor an event in any imagination, but 
a universal. This is, then, a distinctive difference between 
the meaning and its symbol. The meaning is univer al, the 
symbol particular. As Dr. W. T. Harris proves, true human 
thinking involves in every thought the thinking of a univer-
sal. But it must not be forgotten that human thought al o 
involves the particular a the symbol of the universal. 
Herein, then, lies the truth both of nominalism and realism. 
l ominali m was correct when it a serted that we can not 
imagine a triangle without giving some shape to the corners, 
nor a man \\ithout giving him a certain height, and that we 
can not think man or triangle at all without some sort of 
image . But reali m was also correct when it asserted that 
the genus is logically prior to the species, and that general 
names have something more behind them thanflatus 71ocis. 
In the concept - meaning world realism i true. In the 
presentation-symbol world nominalism holds good. 
The chapter may be summed up as follows: that portion 
of the contents of consciousne s 1\hich belongs to a thought-
movement is always obje<.:tified, placed over again t the ego 
as its other. II thought is materialistic in the sense that 
all thought is carried on by spatial and temporal symbols; 
these symbols are pre entatiuns. leaning and symbol are 
inseparable. 1 0 meaning can be known without a presen-
tation-symbol; and no ymbol is of any value to the mind 
except because of its concept-meaning. The symbol is 
al ways spatial and temporal, the meaning al ways conceptual; 
hence, the meaning is not a part of the symbol, nor vice 
versa. 
• 
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CHAPTER III. 
LANGUAGE, SYMBOL, AND REALITY. 
Symbolism and Language. - Language is the second re-
move from meaning, since meaning is symbolized by a 
" psychic " image, and language is the sign system used to 
represent these "psychic" images. Hence, language ha_s 
nothing directly to do with the conceptual world, and is 
wholly "materialistic" in its principles. Words are signs of 
presentations, and of the processes of the presentation-com-
plexes. Language is, accordingly, the symbol of a symbol. 
The word "triangle" stands for the presentation symbol: a 
particular psychic image of a triangle. This image is, again, 
the symbol of the concept triangle. The laws of language 
are therefore the laws of a special kind of symbolism of 
thought. It is a mistake, as fatal as it is frequent, tu treat 
language as if it were a system of logic, as if it had to do 
directly with conceptual relations. Such a treatment must 
lead to one of two errors: · either language is treated as 
some transcendental mystery, or logic is degraded into su~h 
a spatial and temporal affair as language is. The fact is, 
that these two errors actually have crept into both grami:ia~ 
and logic, and confused both. For example, grammati~a 
predication has been confused with the judgment of logic, 
though the two are entirely distinct. Next it should be 
note~ that language is the impression of thought rat~er 
than its expression. Language is not primarily a revela:ion 
of what the speaker thinks, but directions for thinking given 
to the hearer.* In speaking we do not reveal our O\\~n 
thoug~ts except incidentally; but we build up a thought '.n 
the _mmd of the listener. Speaking to a fellow-being is, in 
reality, _treating him with great familiarity. We thrust our -
s~lves mto his presentation-world and raise in it presenta-
tions, c~nnect and separate these presentations, and all, not 
~she will, but as we will. Hence the shock of indecency 
~eech to the chaste, and of profanity to the devout. It 
"Sec Paul Pri · 1 1 t Zeit-schrift fur Volkespsncilp e1s <;>fLanguage, p. 111. Also Von der Gabe en z, ye 10 Ogle, VI, 37 . 
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really doe pollute their presentation-world, forces them to 
harbor, if but for a moment, unclean things. The auditor, 
in fact, to become uch, must abdicate, for the time, his 
sovereignty over his own soul in favor of the speaker, since 
he must give the peaker right to raise any images in his 
world of pre entation · that the latter may choose to com-
mand. The symbolism which language expresses is hence 
nece sarily in manr re. pect · limited and artificial as com-
pared with the symbolism employed ''hen we direct our 
own thoughts. . ince language must be a mutually known 
system, it mu t folio\\ certain highways and continually 
come back into certain rut , in order that hearer and . peaker 
may not part company; when the thinker i: alone he can 
ride cros country in any fashion he chooses. Hence it i 
radically fa.lse to a ·sert that thought is impossible without 
language. The thinker can know the concept triangle 
through the pre. entation of a triangle, and rea ·on him elf to 
the proposition that it interior angles are equal to two 
right angle , ,·ithout saying or thinking a . ingle word. Jn 
fact, the geometer (at lea t the present ' ritcr) doe. not 
think in u·ords "hen rea oning about figure-.. De f mutes 
who e ign language ha· been "holly inadequate to c. ·pre:· 
higher thoughb, have :till had . uch thought·, if '' e may 
accept the te timony gi\·cn by them Iv after being fur-
nished with' ritten language a. a mean . of communica ion. 
Language i a de crip ion of the part of the prc:cntation-
world u ed a the. ymbol of thought. It i. impo-. ible that 
the de cript ion ·hould condition the thing de-.cribcd. 
till it i true, that "ithout language human thought 
\\Ould be barely human, and \\ould never advance beyond 
the rudiments. Road and rut. arc limitations to th1.: 
traveler and hinder him from putting hi foot on the greater 
part of the earth; but still, without road. and paths, .the 
traveler would not ad\·ance far. Every combination of 
symbol and meaning ·ugge t a special insight into the re-
lation of fact. In defining and labeling ab tract idea , 
language i of invaluable service. The image of the word 
in such case generally become the presentation- yrnbol to 
*Stt on thi ubjectjames' P ycbology, I, 266. 
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. . . d ' tly chained. which the concept of the meanmg 1s 1rec ,, 
When discoursing about "righteousness, ove, d . ,, "l " "beauty, 
and the like, introspection seems to show, that the wo~.:~ 
often the only psychic image used as a counter. . 1 d 
visualizers this is generally the form of the word as pn~te · 
With this image the concept is directly associated; an ~o 
far do we often carry this association that the very w?\ -
form itself seems to us lovely, hateful, or contemptib e. 
Isn't "traitor" an ugly word? 
' Artifidal 'Ymh,/,.-Thi' '"b,titution of the pdnted 0{ 
spoken word itself in place of some more natural symbo ' 
eems to be carried further by certain minds. To them even 
"mutton," "tea,"' 'sugar," and the like, are not represe~ted, a~ 
with the most of us by a presentation-image of a piece 0 
' b h inted mutton, a cup of tea, and a spoon of sugar, but y t e pr 
form of these words themselves. But with these images are 
bound up the concepts of the objects, and the mind kno~s 
that they can satisfy hunger, and how they can be procure · 
Therefore, as has been well said if these word-images make a 
. ' d man pay his grocer and butcher, why are they not as good 
as any other symbols? To a certain extent they are as goo 
as any other symbols, and even better. They are defi -
nite, simple, and not liable to mutation during a train· of 
thought, and thereby contribute much to its exactness. But 
on the other hand, they are artificial and as such their con-
nect'.on with the concept is arbitrary, depending only upon 
previous connection through natural symbols. Their hold 
upon the meaning is hence very slight, and sometimes in-com~lete. The full, round, central grasp of the meaning is 
lacking. Thinkers that employ such symbols to excess have a fl t · · · · 
. a • uninteresting field of consciousness, fail to give 
relief to their thoughts, and have a fishy clamlike coolness 
about them th t f ·r . ' 
a a1 s to innervate either themselves or others In a t · 
· cer a1n sense such Alexandrian commentators and thought d' I 
h . - 1ssectors are very profound and thoroug 1 • 
t ey ar~ sticklers for fine distinctions· but nowhere do they gra p with one b Id ff ' . . . 
t l 
. . 
0 e ort of thought the hfe-g1v10g, cen-ra principles h · · ·1 
h w ose infinite ramifications make the detai s w at they are· d h' f 
' an t is because they let the bare image 0 
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their- words in -ti on, - hood, -ity, -ness, and the like, be 
their only symbols, and these symbols, having only a deriv-
ative connection with their meanings, give such a pale and 
lifeless reflection of the meaning, that it is not grasped in its 
full import. 
Practical Nzluc of tltis disti11ction.- The division of thought 
into symbol and meaning is of great practical value. The 
original sin of all sophistry, bombast, and empty rhetoric is 
that they substitute splendor of image for grandeur of 
meaning. Herein lies the difference between true and false 
poetry. In true poetry, the glorious meaning shines and 
scintillate through the translucent symbol. But a symbol 
that symbolizes nothing is less than nothing, it is an abom-
ination before the Lord. There is another evil to which 
especially philosophers are heir and that consists in mis-
taking meagerness in symbol for profundity. And so it ha 
come to pass that the symbols of accepted philosophy are 
lean, lean as the seven lean cattle of Egypt in Joseph's 
dream; and if a thinker dares to put some more luxuriou · 
forms into hi writing, his image-ascetic brethren are likely 
to treat these exprc sions as disrespectfully as were the fat 
kine in our figure by the lean. Exactness in vocabulary is 
a great desideratum, but this is often made an excuse for 
· terility of symbols, and sforility of ymbols has the very 
opposite of the de ired effect. A writer has invented a 
system of symbols that expresses his thought quite sati -
factorily; he sticks to this symbolism through thick and 
thin, gloat· over it, relies on its etymology, spins theories 
out of fine connotations of the word which were never 
taken into account when first the principle was symbolized 
by them, and so, before he knows it, he has a system of 
words instead of a system of thought; and this is the acme 
of idolatry (ci~w;\a= form, hence form-worshipping); he i 
henceforth a quibbler in word . Hence the necessity of 
u ing various symbols, of continually changing the point of 
view to get the true parallax; hence the danger of the petri-
fied poetry of language. 
But langu3ge is a two-edged sword, and it is curious to 
note how, when avoiding one danger, we are liable to fall into 
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the other. Picturesque writers are constantly in danger of 
the uncon ciou . ub titution of a metaphor which includes 
• nd ignor s the problem in place of a solution. Even the 
f mou ".tr am of on ciousness" may be so used. 
,Jfe1111i11.rr and radit)'. W here shall we seek for the ~eality, 
truth, validity, ''hi ch, upposably, is the real obJect of 
thought? Fir tit should be plain that reality is not to be 
ought in the pre. entation-world as such. Neither in the 
pre nt, pa , or future, neither in perception nor in imagin-
lion or memory, doe the presentation-world "touch the 
•round" of reality, but does most decidedly "float in the 
air" f bare appearance. But do we not "come in contact 
i h r ahty" in the pre ·ent preception? ot a whit more 
dir ctly than in memory. But is not what I see now and 
her a dir ct intuition of reality, while what I remember has 
but an inferr d reality':' Let us answer the question scien-
tific. lly by an e.·pe riment. Place an object, your lamp, for 
. · mpl , before. a mirror. Two lamps are seen . If the 
mirror i go d, the eye can not di tinguish the least differ-
nc betw en the two. s presentations they are equal in 
.11 r p ct . pr ntations th e one exists as indubitably 
th other. Hone. tly, then, it is impossible to see apy 
lity in on' lamp th an in th e other. The "direct" 
c n. ct i hr ality turn. out to be more than hadowy; for 
if th im. ge thi .. ide of the mi rror is real, then must also 
h image on the other side be o; and evidently if both 
1m e ar no hing but pre ·entati on , then no other presen-
tion r r al 1ther, •ven if they do not tand before a 
mirr r. Th1 c, n be ho\\ n in a s impler manner. Close the 
. 'I h hole vi ual pre entation-world vanishes. Yes, 
nly e m to \'ani. h, but rea ll y doe vani h; for as per-
it con i ted in being een a nd now all that was seen is 
n. If an · part of thi · world wa real, it was evidently 
de r yed; if nothing real \\as destroyed, then the real was 
ne\• r n at all. Thi shows again how false it is to say 
tha he meanin~ i. a part of the content of the symbol. 1£ 
•l \er • 1 rnuld \'ani-h when the symbol vanishes, be 
doubled by a mirro r, and be non-existent when not per-
Tiie quoted cxpr loo ore from F, H . Bradley's Principles of L<fgic, 
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ceived or imagined. Reality never meets us directly, not 
even in the present, if by "directly" is meant a sense-per-
ception. All reality lies in the judgment about the phe-
nomena. \Ve judge that one lamp-image "i " the lamp and 
the other but the reflection of it. Therefore memory and 
perception, the past and the present stand on precisely 
equal terms so far a reality is concerned. "I see a house," 
means, I have a perception called a house, and I judge that 
there really exists an abode of man. The reality of the 
hou'ic.:: lies in its relations; in fact, as a reality it is but a 
systc.::m of relations. But no relation a such is perceived by 
the senses. The fact that I sec the house does not make it 
<1bsolutely certain that it exi ts. Hallucinations are al o 
facts. "I remember the house," means also that I have an 
image in my presentation-world called house, and that I 
jud~e said image stands for something real. But this time 
also I may be mi ·taken. In both ca cs, the presentation-
world does not contain the real, but in both ca es it is 
judged that the real is symbolized by the presentation; 
therefore, al ·o, o{i:takes are possible in both ca es. That 
there i · a difference in the di'J;Yt't' of certainty, is quite pos-
sible, but the difference is one of degree only. ~ a rule, it 
is doubtless true that we arc more certain of the reality of 
''hat we perceive than of what we remember; but what i 
here contended for, i. that the nature of the certainty is the 
same whether a perc ption or a memory is in question; and 
that thi certainty i · derived fr m a conclusion, a judgment. 
. ·or must it be forgotten th'.l.t though the general rule give· 
greater certainty to perception, this i · by no mean true 
without exception. re there not in the life of every one 
certain memories of "the mile and tears of bygone years" 
which appear so absolutely indubitable that \ e can not 
.,·en imagine how a ·hadow of doubt hould be ca t upon 
them; while in our every day experience are there not hun-
dreds of perceptions that at the time of perceiving them we 
arc.:: at a lo s to know how to interpret? 
Tit,· real and ideal i11 tltc conceptional 1.eorld.- o we 
nlay take it for granted that the "p ychic image" and the 
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percept have nothing directly to do with reality.* The 
next question is, naturally: Do meaning and reality 
coincide? Or, in other words, is everything in the concep-
tual-meaning world real? An examination will show that if 
"real" i taken a opposed to "ideal" the real and the ideal 
are both in the realm of meaning. And not only so, but 
the real and ideal po sess a great part of the' territory of 
meaning (the conceptual world) in common. There are 
many meanings which are partly real and partly ideal. 
There are degrees of reality. Most of us, possibly, have a 
definite conception of the character of Micawber. When-
ever we de ire to be conscious of this meaning, we allow the 
optimistic but unfortunate creation of Dickens to appear a 
few moment on the stage of our thoughts and repeat his 
humorou: wi dom. By watching the image-play we get 
the concept of Micawber's character, which as a concept is 
not patial or temporal. v\'e know, as we say, what sort of 
a fellow he wa . This knowledge is the meaning of this 
·ymbol. i'ow it is eviden t that in our stricter and com-
moner en e of real, Micawber is not real. · Hence, here is an 
. ample of a meaning that is not real, but ideal. Still, a 
clo r ob ·crvation will make it apparent that to a certain 
d grce even ~Iicawber possesses reality . As a character of 
fie ion, a a thought many have had, Micawber does exi~t, 
and i in ·o far real. Any number of degrees of reality can 
b given. That \ hich exists of necessity, exists forever, 
exi t. now, did exi t, hall exi t, may exist, could exist, etc. 
Th conclu ion is, then, that the ideal and the real are 
found in the realm of meaning only. 
T 11 r.r <n' Critici•m of H<rhert Spcne.r. 
-P.\RT I l. 
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T!!nu;irr. 
CIL\PTER IV. 
THE Fu 'DAMENTAL THOUGHT-FORMS. 
Contrast of tlu content space and time.-The philosophy of 
the sentence depends entirely on the formal side of the pre-
sentation-world. There arc two univer al forms of thought 
that apply to the world of sense and imagination: spac, 
arid time. ince Ari totle the di tinction of form and con-
tent has been current among philosophers, and since Kant 
all speculation not hopelessly retrogressive has recognized 
time and space as in some sense the forms of thought. 
The e forms are antithetical and measure the widest 
contrast possible. The contrast of greatest importance is, 
however, not that the one is the form of "outer" perception 
and the other of "inner" experience, nor that some presen-
tations seem to escape space, while none get outside of 
time, nor that time is of one dimension only and space of 
three. The fundamental contrast is deeper. Space is till' 
fonn of plurality. Everything perceived in space is per-
ceived as beinl?:, if taken strictly, more titan one. However 
small a piece of matter we perceive or imagine, it is evident 
that its upper half is not the same as the lower half. The 
north end, even of a molecule is not identical with the south 
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end. If an atom is not a centre of energy only and without 
extent, its middle is one piece of matter and its surface 
wholly another piece having a totally different identity. 
\ e may subdivide eternally but we shall never find the 
absolute unit in space. The content of space (not space 
itself) i and must be essentially a plurality. 
Exactly the reverse is true of time. Time is tlte form of 
unity. The content of time is one unit; everything perceived 
in time i a one of absolute identity throughout. The 
paper upon which I write is the same paper now as it was 
an hour ago. If I tear it to pieces, these contain exactly 
the ame matter as the whole sheet did before. Even if it 
i burned, the gaseous carbon, oxygen, and hydrogen, the 
moke and the a hes contain precisely as much matter and the 
identical atoms of the paper. The world is one stupendous 
proce of metamorphosis, not ::i series of creations and 
annihilations. row, it may be objected that since it is pos-
·ible to believe in the creation of matter it is a fortiore pos-
ible to conceive at lea t the possibility of annihilation and 
creation, and thus it would be possible to break in thought 
the continuity and unity of the content of time. The con-
tent before creation would not be identical with the content 
after. But this problem is solved by noting that if the 
world i created, it existed before its creation potentially in 
the ' i dom and might of the creator. By believing in " 
creation, we imply deny that matter is irreducible to some-
thing el e and claim that it can be reduced to the energy of 
the creator, that, in fact, matter is energy. This may not be 
thought out explicitly by the believer, but is nevertheless 
I lent in hi thought. Every cross-section of time therefore, 
ho'' the same atoms, energy, and laws, every cross-section 
of pace show a different content from every other. 
The contrast of time and space may be formulated a follo, · : 
Every moment of time has a content identical with every 
other moment of time, but no point of space has the same 
content a any other point of space. It is necessary, to pre-
vent a fatal misconception, to understand explicitly that 
when we claim that time and space are the forms of unity 
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and plurality, we do not claim that time and space them-
selves are unities or pluralities. Either may at will be con-
ceived as a plurality (of points or moments) or as a unity, 
a continuum. But the content of time is always conceived 
as being really a unity, and the content of space as a pl ural-
ity. 
It is to be noted that the questions of identity, plurality, 
and unity can not be decided by the perceptive faculties 
alone. We can not perceive identity. Hence the whole 
discussion on the forms of perception and imagination (the 
forms of the presentation-world) is based on something 
more than mere perception. It is instinctive speculation, 
the native philosophy of perception that is here involved. 
It were palpable nonsense to say that the universe appears 
at every moment the same, but it is certain that the world is 
taken to be the appearance of the sum of the same forces, 
laws, and atoms. Likewise it were sheer folly to assert that 
no two pebbles could be found exactly alike, or no two 
drops of water precisely similar, or no t\\ o places in the sky 
indistinguishably the same in color, but even a savage would 
not, and could not, on that ground assert identity between 
two objects. Conceptual identity is not the same as per-
ceptual likcnt.s ·. 
Tiu result of tlus contrast i11 science How much of \\hat 
many devotees of natural science suppose a discovery by 
experiment is purely an a-priori law of the mind. The in-
penetrability and infinite divisibility of matter is a direct 
corollary of the exclusiveness of space; and the conserva-
tion of energy, the indestructibility of matter, and nature's 
uniform conformity to law are derived from the inclusive-
ness of time. Even the laws of motion and inertia are 
nothing but special application of the great p ychological 
principle· underlying presentation in time and space. The 
phogiston of the media!val physicist wa · a piece ot inac-
curate thought and vanished just as much before the greater 
lucidity of the modern mind a· by the aid of chcele's 
balance. There is a story of a German professor who evap-
orated and distilled a quantity of water in a sealed copper 
retort for the space of many months, to prove the indestruc-
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t1b1hty of every portion of the water in its every change of 
form. He might have spared himself the trouble. If it had 
not been in us to believe it by the very nature of conscious-
ne s, no amount of experimenting could have proven it. If 
experimenting could prove this, then the old gardener was 
also correct who was sure of another year's lease of life as 
oon as the month of 1arch was past, since for eighty years 
he had noticed that whenever he lived over the month of 
~larch he lived all the rest of the year. In both cases 
induction i - impossible, since it is impossible by the nature 
of th se problem· to get sufficien t data. 
All mathematics is based on th ese two principles alone, 
which in that relation are best expressed as extension and 
multiplicity, duration and succession. 
In relation to symbolic presentation of thought, the two 
great presentation-forms of thought may be characterized 
a follow : 
pace i the form whose content has multiplicity, exten-
ion, di cretion, exclusion, outside-of-one-another-ness. 
Time i · the form whose content has unity, duration, con-
inui y, inclusion, in-it ·elf-ness. 
CHAPTER V. 
THE C.\ I' EGOR JES OF SPACE. 
the ba i. of all grammatical categories there are 
cer ain logico-p ·ychological categories based on the proper-
ti of the thought-forms just discussed. These categories 
ar our ne. ·t ta k. 
Tiu category of tlzing. The primary and also the funda -
mental category of space i · Thing, or concrete individualized 
• umb r. "olor and other qualities unite the infinite multi -
plicity of . pace into arbitrary, individualized aggregates 
which we call thing .. 
Thing i the primary category o ( thought as well as of 
pace; for the ·1mpllst way to conceive the world is as a 
<>llection of thingc;. . \ child does not perceive at all before 
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it sees things. At the very threshold of perception it 
encounters things. Atomism is the reigning philosophy in 
the nursery and in the hut of the savage. 
According to the primitive judgment by which we app re-
hend Thing, we conceive it as existing in itself a nd not at 
all in another. Where the pen is, the ink is not; where th e 
penetrating nail is, the board is not. Discretion, ou tside-of-
one-another-ness is the very essence of our conception of 
Thing. The independent existent it might be called. This 
separating, individualizing of a part of the sense-continuum 
as a thing must be performed by the smallest child that 
distinguishes it s mother's face from a stranger's. This being 
the import of thing, the next question is, For what is it used 
as a symbol? The answer is almost self-evident, For that 
wh ich exists in and by itself, the self-existent, substance. 
To the end of tim e philosophers will think and talk of the 
most real and ac tual under the thought-form of thing. 
Protest as we may again st the inadequacy of the symbol, 
we shall continue to talk of the mind, spirit, the subject, the 
ego, personality, the self-existent, as things. But with this 
distinction: in advanced thought, tlaing is merely a symbol, 
and a dangerou one, of the self-existent; in primitive 
though t and in much speculation that fain would be advanced, 
thing is the self-existent. To sum it up: the category of 
thing stands for substance, reality, identity. and discretion, 
for the self-existent . 
Numbcr.-True unity is not found in th(" space-presen-
tati on. That chair is not a true unit, it has part , and th e 
part exist wholly in themselves and not at all in their 
neighboring parts. \ e speak of the presentation chair not 
th e concept. Every particle of wood is imagined and, as 
far a perceived, perceived outside of every other particle, 
and no man can imagine, or perceive, wood \\here the glue 
is, or vice versa. To be sure the concept of the physical 
universe holds, as gravitation teaches, that dynamically 
every atom is·present in every other, but it is impossible for 
perception or imagination to perceive, or imagine, this unity. 
To these faculties the space-world has real particularity and 
plurality, but only formal univer ality and unity. A equals 
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not-B. Space makes the universe a collection of pa~ticulars. 
Hence physics teaches that the material universt: is a col-
lection of atoms. Logically, these must be held to be cen-
ters of force without size, for else the whole problem of a?-
hesion and attraction remains untouched and unsolved in 
every atom. Why the north half of an atom hangs to the 
south half, though the north half only touches and is wholly 
outside of the south half, needs as much explanation as 
· why 
the south hemisphere of the earth adheres to the north. 
But the average physicist's understanding is satisfied when 
it has outstripped his imagination, and so he generally con-
cludes that the atoms are "very small," "probably sphei:-
ical," and "of the same size." "If a pin's head were magni-
fied to the size of the earth the atoms would probably not 
exceed a pin's head in siz~, and might be so far separated 
from one another that an inhabitant on one might need a 
tiny telescope to see the next." Very likely indeed! This 
picturesque philosophy may have its attractions and is cer-
tainly harmless. But all we have to do with it at present, 
is to point out that it is an unsuccessful attempt to get at 
unity where in the nature of the case none can be had. The 
World of space-presentations is essentially a plurality, and 
hence space gives us number. Number is, therefore, a nec-
essary attribute of space-presentation. An arbitrary, formal 
unit is taken, and by the aid of this, quantity is expressed 
as a finite number. Substantives, as the signs of things, 
accord.ingly, often have the property of expressing number by their torm. 
Hence number is the fundamental attribute of thing . 
. umber as the fundamental attribute, however, is multipli-
city without unity. True grammatical and mathematical 
_number requires, in addition, unity. Somethi.ng must be 
taken as the unit before any finite number arises. In order 
to get grammatical number from the unitless discretion of spa~e we must invent an arbitrary unit. We must choose a ~efisti?g-place somewhere for a division that else would be 
in n1te On th· f B' . h t 
· . is act 1shop Berkely based his claim t a 
nuf mb.er is a whoUy subjective affair. What is the number 0 a library? Th b 1. 
e num er of shelves, books, chapters, mes, 
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words, or letters? Using the terms of the Hegelian analysis, 
we should call grammatical and mathematical number 
Anzaltl, which is the resultant of Zaltl (here multiplicity, 
discretion), and Ei11lteit (here the arbitrary unity). 
We do not class number as a special category, since it is 
simply the abstraction of the category of thing. Things are 
simply incarnate number. Things are expres ed in language 
by substantives (nouns and pronouns). 
Tlte category of quality.-Amount and color of light, taste, 
smell, and the qualities perceived by tactual perception (the 
"feel" of things), as smoothness, hardness, heat and the like, 
are the individualizers of space. Quality, in short, reduces 
abstract divisibility and discretion into things. Qualified 
discretion=concrete number=things, objects. A unit with 
a quality is a thing. The second category of space, quality, 
is tlte unifying factor in tlte abstract plurality of space. 
Quality is conceived as existing in another, a the depen-
dent existent. It is a fractional tlti11g, the continuity in the 
space-world in spite of its fundamental discreteness. Tastes 
and colors are typical qualities. They exist in space and 
still they do not occupy space. The sweetne s of sugar 
does not hinder it from being white in the same space, but 
one thing hinders every other thing from being at the same 
place. Qualities are dependent in their existence. \Ve can 
always imagine a thing as existing after the destruction or 
mutation of certain of its qualities; but we can not imagine 
a quality surviving its thing. Hence quality-presentations 
are used as the symbols of attributes. Quality is expressed 
by the adjective. 
ext of the categories of space comes 
Position (or space-relation).- B stands north of A. In 
perceiving A and B, we unquestionably also perceive the 
northne s. The book is on the table. The book and the 
table can not be perceived without also perceiving the relative 
position of the book to the table; but where is this relative 
position, this on-ness? 'ot in the book alone, nor in the 
table certainly, nor in the space or line between the book 
and the table; for, if book and table were removed, there 
would be no on in the line that had been between. Evidently, 
~~----------------------~ 
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here is something that exists not in the self (book) a~ the 
thing, nor in the other (table) as the quality; but in a highe~ 
unity of self and other. Position is the highest category 0 
space-presentations, and is used as the symbol of related 
beings. . 
The category of position is the result of an applicatwn 
of the laws of time (continuity) to space. Matter is wholly 
outside-of-one-another. Molecule A has no usmess, b · and 
can have no business, with molecule B, according to the 
geometric conception of the universe. "A thing can not 
act where it is not," said the ancient philosophers compla-
Ct:!ntly. (The dynamic conception of the universe reverses 
this judgment, but does so by conceiving the universe not a 
collection of things at all, but as a system of forces.) As 
soon as we speak of a relation between things, we have made 
things the members of a ltiglter unity, the universe. . 
To prevent a fatal misconception and consequent obJeC-
tion, it is to be noted that both number and position may be 
thought of as qua] ity (ex. five, former) and consequently be 
rcpre ented by adjectives. This can be done, however, only 
after a change of category (see p, ), that universal prac-
tice in language, of thinking what properly belongs to one 
category under the form of another. It is evident that 
before number can be thought of separate from thing, it 
mu t by a violent abstraction be degraded from its position 
a!; the fundamental of thing. 
Po ition, or pace-relation, is represented in language by 
''ca ·es" and prepositions. All prepositions and cases repre-
sent, hen~e, when not used figuratively, and even then in the 
pre ·e nt~t1on-\\orld, nothing but space-relation. R~· 1.izc-U: of categories of space.- The fundamental category 
of tl~ing 111 a way includes the other two. The category of 
quality is more abstract, and is the reconciliation of a contr~diction. It introduces a lower unity in the essential ~lurality 0 .f pace. Position is the application of the laws 
. f th~ antithetical thought-form (time) to space. It consists 
in a ?igher uuity of plurality. Thing== existence in itself, quality - ex· t · . · 
. - is ence 111 an Other. Position = existence 111 the union of elf and Other. 
• 
• 
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Summary of categories of space, or prcscntatio11s of extension. 
Category. Thought as ) Symbol of 
1. THING .... Discrete,cxisting in itself;inde- !Substance, 
pendent being; occupied space; ( Identity & 
concrete number. j Contrad. 
2. QuALITY .. Existing in another; dependent ) 
being; in space, but not occupy- r Attribute. 
ing it; a lower unity in plurality. j 
3. Po~1 rION .. Space relation; existence in a I 
higher unity. Application of ~ Relation. 
the laws of time to pace. 
CHAPTER VJ. 
THE C.\TEGORIE oF TrnE. 
Tht t't1l<gory of cvrnt.-The primary category of time is 
the event. Herc l'<'flll is used in its broadest signification. 
According to this, 'apoleon was an event as \\ell as a thing, 
and imilarly we \\Ould speak of the existence of the pyra-
mids as an event. Any individualized portion of time i · 
here called an event. To sec the world as a serie of event· 
is probably the second phase of human consciousnes in it 
development from infancy. Fir ·t, as we noticed, the child 
th1nb the universe as a collection of things; next, it prob-
ably ri ·e · to the category of event, and the universe becomes 
a continuou chain of event-. 
Tiu "double dimmsion," or doubfr tlwugltt-(orm of an event. 
There is a notable p ychological difference between the 
first category of time and the first of space. Though in the 
nature of thing it i impos ible to have a space-occupring 
content that does not also occupy time, ince, for example, 
a pyramid or a soap-bubble can not be een, or imagined, at. 
all, without being seen, or imagined, during some period of 
time; yet it is po sible wholly to withdraw the attention 
~~---------------------
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from this fact and hence be quite unconscious o 1 • · f ·t But 
on the contrary it is not possible to let the attenti~n rest 
exclusively on the time-content. We can not imagine or 
perceive an event, or happening, without giving some a~t~n­
tion and full consciousness to the fact that it is some thing 
that happens. An event is always the event of some thing. 
We can not fill duration without a thing, but we can fill 
space without being conscious of having to do with events. 
This psychological fact determines two very importan.t 
things in grammar, the subject and the complement (pr~d 1,~ 
cate noun or adjective). Every true event-word ("finit~ 
verb, participle, or infinitive) can take a subject. That is, 
whenever we express an event we must express, or imp]~, 
some tlti11g as subject of the event, since it is necessary 10 
thinking an event also to think its subject. 
In determination, (the "modifying" of another element) 
also, this double nature of the category of event plays an 
important part. A thing is determined (modified) by spac~­
presentations only, but an event may be determined ( m~di­
fied) by both space and time presentations. What a thrng 
is at this moment it i's, no matter in what manner it has 
pa ·sed the eternity a parte post, and is to pass the eternity to 
come. But the case is different if the question is of an 
event. Duration is determined not only by !tow it endures 
but al o by wlzat it endures. To endure for forty centuries 
in ab olute quiescence is not, perhaps, so very sublime a ~hought if the thought is of a pebble, but it is awe-inspiring 
if conceived of a pyramid. Thing is, then, determined only 1 ~ one "form" (the only one it has), the "form" of space. I~ven~: on the other hand, persists in having two "dimen-
sion • or forms, time and space, although its proper 
thought-form, that on which the emphasis is laid, is time; 
a_nd hence event may be determined (modified) both as to 
•me a nd space. Thi explains the "predicate adjective" (or 
attribute complement) and "predicate noun." This adjective 
elem.ent doe really determine (or, if the term is preferred, 
qua.lify) the \crb ol the predicate and not directly the 
subject. Ex. "The diamond is brilliant" == The diamond 
ha a brilliant existence, The diamond is a brilliant event. 
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Existence is predicated of dianwud. This is, however, a 
wholly uninteresting predicate, because it is so wide. Hence 
it is determined spatially by the mention of the quality 
brilliant. The objection: "\Ne are not conscious of predicat-
ing existence at all in thi case; is is a mere copula," will be 
answered later. 
Duration.-An event is a concrete individualized duration 
just as a thing is a concrete individualized number. Hence 
duration is the fundamental property of the first category 
of time just as number is of the first of space. ,\n event may 
be spoken of without reference to the time it endures, as go, 
:t•rnt, it. iit; and it may also be asserted to have occupied 
some time, as was gomg, ibat. Accordingly there are two 
species of verbs and expressions of events in reference to 
duration: (a), aorist, as vchit; (b), progressive, a «cltcbnt. 
Grammatical duration corresponds in the time-form to 
grammatical number in the space-form. The singular and 
plural in number corresponds to the aorist and progressive 
of duration. The corre pondence is, of course, antithetical. 
If we de ire a refined subtlety in our nomenclature, we may 
call number as afimdamc11tal property of thing, discretion, and 
likewi. e duration as a fundamental property of event, co11-
ti11uity, and keep number and duration as terms for the more 
concrete grammatical properties. 
The category of ma1111cror ;•arintio11 -Continuity, or ab. tract 
duration, alone would be one empty, limitless ameness, 
\\Orthle s and unintere ting to man if there were not a 
secondary category to individualize the first. This is van·a-
tion, or 11u11111a. If all events happened alike, there would 
be no events. The variation, the change that diver ifies 
duration, plays the same role for event as quality does for 
thing. Just a the infinitely plural points of . pace are united 
into aggregates called things by the second category of 
space, viz., quality, so, and yet contrariwi e, the infinite 
continuity of time is broken up into fractions called events, 
by the econd category of time, variation. For example, 
how do we perceive extension in a thing, say a clover leaf? 
By perceiving a green surface with a trilobed outline. But 
this green urface is where the clover-leaf ends and nothing 
-
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begins. In seeing the form of the leaf, we se_e the edg_e 
where there is clover-leaf no longer, but something else, air 
or table-cloth, perhaps. Hence to perceive a clover-leaf 
mean: to perceive where it ends, to perceive what is not a 
clover-leaf. The space occupied by the leaf is absolutely 
hidden from my perception. If I touch it, my fingers come 
only to where the leaf is. Hence the surprising result, 
that the negation of a thing is just what makes it a thing. 
The perception of sub tance is therefore the perception of 
the very thing that is not substance, but its attributes, its 
determinations, its negations. To sum it up: extension, 
number, the essence of the space-form, is known to us in 
objects, things; but thing is known by negation of extension, 
and number by its limit; hence thing reveals extension by a 
ecming denial of it.' The case of the time-form, and its 
e . ence, duration, is analogous. Duration is known only by 
vari tion, change, motion; were we and the world changeless, 
th re would be no time. But change is known by the denial 
of duration. How could change occur if something in 
the changing object did not pass away, and something new 
and different take its place? 
It is to be noticed that variation is the true name of the 
category, not motion. For motion requires duration as an 
element. At first sight motion seems the very antithesis of 
duration. But it only seems o. Motion would be impos-
ible without duration. If an apple is to fall, it must be the 
. :\me apple on the ground as it was on the bough. To-night 
we ee a planet in one sign of the Zodiac, and a week hence 
\·e hall ee it in the next; but before we judge it has 
moved from the one ign to the other, we satisfy ourselves that 
i i the same planet that we observed on the former night. 
If a ro\ · of electric lights placed very closely together are 
lighted and extinguished rapidly in succession, it will appear 
, if one ball of light traveled the whole length of the road; 
but we judge this appearance of motion to be an illusion, since 
the fir ·t light i. not the same as the last, or as any other light. 
Every event, then, is composed of the fundamental 
element, duration, and the secondary element, variation. 
If the empha is is laid on duration, we get existence. Ex. 
-
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Xerxes was king. His endurance as king is emphasized, but 
we could not know duration without at least some variation. 
If the stress of consciousness falls on variation, we get 
motion. Ex. Xerxes fought with Greeks. Verbs may accord-
ingly be divided in reference to variation and duration, into 
two classes, substantive verbs (static verbs) and motion verbs 
(dynamic ,;erb). 
The first class expresses. l Duration Event-
Variation 
The second class expresses: l Duration Event Variation 
~ - existence. 
~ =motion. 
The e\·cnt, unquestionably, includes that which endures, 
but just as certainly there is something in motion that 
perishes. To be sure, this is thought of a the unimportant, 
the accidental, sometimes as the unreal, the seeming; but 
still it i something. Thi something when abstracted from 
the event is the circum tance, the manner, the mode, the 
vanat1on. ariation may thus be defined as that which varies 
in the enduring. It i·, accordingly, the seeming negation 
of the very essence of the time-form (duration, continuity), 
ju ·t as quality is the apparent negation of discretion. The 
event i · thought of as that which exist in another and still 
exists in itself. The child, the savage, and the avant look 
upon the bird and its Aying as two different affair . The 
bird's Aying can not exi ·t without the bird, but still the 
Aight of the bird i not a part of the bird, as a quality is a 
part of the thing. The bird is just as much a bird when 
it alights. llere event (motion and existence) i distin-
guished from quality. A green apple that turn red is not 
fully the same apple as before; but the falling apple and 
the apple after it ha fallen are fully the same apple. \Ve 
speak now of the natural. unsophisticated way of thinking. 
Evidently an>·thing ran be thought of as a quality. We 
rnay then conclude that quality is dependent existence in 
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another, event dependent self-existence in another. In 
other words, motion and existence are thought of as both 
dependent and independent at once.. .No~ comes the 
important conclusion. Therefore vanat1on 1s .dependent 
being of dependent being, or a dependent being of the 
. econd order. Hence variation (manner) is a category that 
can be u ed with any dependent category, as motion or 
quality, but not with a truly independent category, as .thing. 
Things have no manner. This is the reason why, in the 
ign of the categories, adverbs can modify both adjectives 
and verb but not nouns. Manner or variation, the second 
category of the time·-form, has as its sign the adverb. 
Variation introduces a secondary plurality in the funda-
mental unity of time, just as quality gave a secondary unity 
to the fundamental plurality of space. 
CHAPTER VII. 
THE CATEGORIES OF TIME. 
(CONTINUED.) 
Tiu CatLgory of Succession. - In order to make anything 
out of time,\ e have een that we must get a plurality into its 
unity. But under variation thi multiplicity was still avow-
edly ccondary. If, however, we consi tently apply the 
fundamental law of space to time, we get a view of duration 
in which discretion is primary- the world becomes a series 
of event , a succes ·ion. The category of succession appeal's 
in grammar as state of verbs and a conjunctions. 
tale. \: e have now discussed the two sides of motion 
and exi tence (the event), the enduring and the perishing 
component . But do not motion and existence themselves 
have an absolute beginning or end? Every day we see 
object· begin to move and again come to rest; every dav 
thing "spring into exi ·tence," and again "pass away.;' 
How, then, can motion or existence be said to represent the 
enduring? imply because we are so made that we can not 
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believe that the apparent end of motion (or existence) is 
the end of it. Here we simply refuse to believe our senses. 
The contrast between time and space is in this respect 
complete. Everywhere between the beginning and the end 
of an event, the event is considered the same, and even 
before the beginning and after the end of the event proper 
it is believed to exist in some other form ; it is imagined to 
exist as a motion too small in oscillation to be perceived. 
On the other hand, where a thing ends (in space, not in time) 
it docs end, and nowhere between the limits of a thing is 
the thing the same. A pin'~ head is not the same piece of 
metal as its point; no, if molecules have size, the south side 
can never be identical with the north side of a molecule. 
It is therefore events as the revelation of force that we 
consider. A force can exist in three states: (I) not yet 
revealed as an event, a potentiality; ( 2) being revealed in 
motion,* an actuality; ( 3) having been revealed by motion,* 
a nsult. 
It is to be noted that from the point of view of the 
presentation - world, it is perfectly proper to speak of 
motion, not force, a enduring. Force can not be imagined 
or perceived in it purity. It is a concept. When force 
exists as potentiality or result, it is accordingly pictured by 
the imagination as some sort of small motion that escapes 
common observation. This pictorial reasoning is carried 
into physics, and so all energies are converted into modes 
of motion; and heat, the form in which the result of motion 
often appears, i gladly accepted as a mode of molecular 
motion. , incc we thus move in the symbol-world, we may 
with propriety say that an c\ent may exist in three states: 
n) potential, 
b) actual, 
c) perfected (as result, real). 
erb:; and participials ought to furnish :;igns for these 
di tinctions. Potentiality is generally represented, not by a 
form of every verb, but by a special cla:;s of verbs, here 
called the potential verb:;; the:;e arc in English may, can, 
*All e\'cnts arc revealed bv motion, heucc we use 1 'n1otion" alone in these 
ca es, \Vhere at fir t sight one· would expect ·•event" or "existence and motion." 
.. ~~~----------.............. .. 
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must, need, will, sltall, and perhaps a few others. These a~e 
distinguished in English by a peculiar inflection. Ther: is 
in English no corresponding infinitive or participle, w~ich 
renders the English very poverty-stricken m comp 
· anson 
with the German and Swedish in so-called potential moo.cl 
combinations. In English a marvel like the follow!i:g is 
infinitive supine in:fi~t~tve impossible. wedish): Jag skulla hafva kunnat vilJa se. 
(I should have coulded will see.) This means, as near a~ the 
rude English can express it: I might possibly have liked 
to ee. The future participles* of Latin and Greek a~d ~he 
future infinitivest of Greek ari also signs of potentiality, 
and not at all future in nature. Recturus est, he is about to 
rule. Recturus expresses the present potentiality, no~ a 
future actuality. His present state is such that ruling is a 
ure result. 'Aovrara 7Cpa~<zr 'v7Czffxrovrraz. They 
promi e to be about to perform impossible things. Strictly 
peaking, they do not promise to perform (7Cpa-r-rBZr), but to 
be in such a state now that performance will necessarily 
follow. This is, of course, equivalent to promising a future 
actuality, but grammatically it is not the same. All future 
ten ·e might be explained as potential; but for reasons 
which will appear when we arrive at assertion, it is proper 
not to do so with the finite verbs. 
Actuality is expre ed in English by the present and 
P t tense of the verb, the present participle, and the infini-
ive; in Latin by the present, first future, imperfect, and 
P rfect. hi ·torical; in Greek by the (indicative) present, 
future, imperfect, and aorist, with the exception that the 
aori t ~articiple represents an action as perfect except when 
the chief verb i in the aorist. 
Re ult, or the perfect state, is represented in English by 
the perfect pa ive participle alone. In Latin by the logica I 
P. rfe~t, pluperfect, and future perfect. o in Greek· Eng~1. h, modern Greek, German, Swetlish, Norwegian-
?ani h, Icelandic, Anglo- axon, Gothic, French and Span-~ave, in pitL of the numerous perfect tenses in their 
th• ;;aa.ir:;,c_ipial wi~I be treated of together with verbs when practicable, thou1<ll 
tLatin 'ha. ar;::,e t not to suppose that the participial is a true verb. 
r<t:ognizc no forms 0~~ futubre infiniti.ve, since for reasons already given, dve 
· ever s or partidpials composed of t\vo or more \var 8 • 
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grammars, no form of the finite verb which expresse per-
fect action. They use a circumlocution with ltm1e and a 
participial. This seems to be a Germanic invention, which 
the Viking conquerors of the world introduced even into the 
Romance and Hellenic tongues. The analysis of this inter-
esting construction must be deferred till participials are 
reached. 
State compared witli case. - The state of the verb corre-
sponds to the case of the substantive, but corresponds, as 
we would expect, in an antithetical manner. The case 
determines the space - po ition of the object as measured 
from the governing word. 
tylem cepit. The m in sty/em hows the space-position 
of sty/em in relation to ccpit. The pen was the goal of the 
motion of taking. Likewise, the state of the verb determines 
the time-position of the event, mea ured from the time of 
actualization of tilt' C<'Cllf. Ex., scripsit. The position of scrip-
sit is determined as being that of result. The measuring 
i backwards to its Oit!ll actualization, scribit. Hence scripsit 
one of the succuding members to scribit in the time-
succe ion. 
\ hile, thus, case repre ents pace-po ition and state 
time-po ·itio n, there is a verr important contrast between 
the l\\O. A thing measures its po'>ition from rwoflttr. In 
:->pace only one position is occupied by one thing. But an 
event determines its place in the ti me-succession from itulf. 
since it is from its O<t'll actualization that the state of the 
\·erb 1s determined. Teleologically there i'> also a contra t. 
The position of a sub">tantive i determined in order that 
the substantive thereby may limit the meaning of the word 
governing. Ex. John'. house. :lc1lz11's is determined by '.1 
in order that Yoltn's may limit house. The time - ucces ion 
of the verb or participial is determined for the sake of the 
verb or participial itself. 
The tense or time of the verb is a property that also in a 
sense corre ponds to position in space, and i · al o a form 
of succes ion. But it belongs really to the whole proposi-
tion, and is discussed under Assertion. ( ee Part Ill , 
"Syntax," Chap. IX.) 
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either can abstraction be complete in the category of 
quality. We can not picture beauty without also picturing 
a beautiful thing. Attention can be centred in a quality, but 
it can not be exclusively occupied with a quality. The 
ab. traction from the rest of the universe, from what is not 
that quality, can not be complete. Quality is always a 
portion of a thing. Because of this similarity in demanding 
the pre entation of thing as forming a subordinate portion 
of their phere of attention and their consequent inability 
to land alone in con ciou ness, event and quality may be 
call d the secondary categories, and thing the primary 
cate~ory. 
The relation of thing to event is, however, quite different 
from i relation to quality. The quality is a part of the 
hing, the event i only unittd to the thing. The bird and 
i flying are nc·o, not 011t. The Right is not a part of the 
bird. 
'> ariation, or manner, can not be perceived or imagined 
ithout the accompaniment of the content of at least two 
o her ca egorie", thing and event or thing and quality, since 
·ari tion inhere in quality and event and can not, according-
ly. i hou one of the e Le pre entcd to con ciousncss. As 
th e can no be pre. ntcd without prcscntin~ thing, there 
can b n pre ntation o( variation without at least two sub-
pre cnt tion , either event and thing or quality and thing. 
I' ition pac - rcla ion) and :ucccs ion (time -·relation) 
require al o at 1 a t t\ o other pre ·cntation , viz.: tho e 
be hich he relation exi ·t" Hence in the case of 
hrcc cat g rie., variation, position, and succession, 
phere of a ten ion can not be restricted by abstraction 
th n hrcc catenorie ·. Hence these may be called 
Urtzary rat 'gOries. 
Cltan,{e of category.- Wc arc not satisfied with the natural 
and direct u. age of th ymbol . Often a symbol is placed 
in a ca egory ' hich 1 . uits only indirectly and artificial-
ly. The Thirty Year' War, for example, is not always, 
indeed eldom, thought as an event (they fought for thirty 
year , but generally a thing (war). l\Iotion, action, 
eing, in fac all noun. exprcs ing events, are examples of 
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what naturally belongs to the category of event being 
brought under the category of thing. 
The psychology of the change of category is a rather 
abstruse subject, but the following seems at any rate estab-
lished. As has just been remarked, it is impossible to 
imagine any event or quality alone. thing is also always 
present in consciousness. Take the rather commonplace 
lines: "0 the world is full of beauty when the heart is full 
of love." \\'e can not imagine beauty; what we do present 
to our minds is beautiful-thing. Rut though a true 
thing-presentation is thus present, its right and essence i 
neglected; it is treated a if it never existed, and its tlzi11g11css 
(space-occupying property) is tmnsferrcd to tile quality. The 
quality is henceforth a thing in thought, and has all the 
space-occupying properties of a thing. Beauty must be 
thought with spatial dimensions, in order to be that with 
which anything can be jilkd. Ex. "i\Iohammed severed 
with a sharp blO\ the brazen serpent's head from the tripod." 
Herc blow i symbolized by a moving arm and sword. That 
is to . ay, the center of attention and iuterc. is the motion, 
but the arm and :word, though not in the center, arc still inside 
the phere of attention. Rut, although in the sphere of at-
tention, tlztir oistu1rc is not raog11iud; on the contrary, the 
space-occcupying properties and the independent existence 
are tran fcrrcd to the event, the blow. Thus the event 
blow becomes a thing. This is the regular proces in the 
change of category, and may thus be ummarized: The 
portion of con ciousne s that fall out ide of the category 
which contains the center of attention, is ignored in the 
combination of thought and has no \·alue in th organi m of 
the sentence. But the properties of this neglected portion 
of consciousne are transferred to the portion containing 
the center of con ciou ne. s, and hence this latter portion i 
changed into the category of the neglected part. ery 
often, however, this regular process is interrupted, it seems, 
by the substitute of wholly artificial symbol . Thu , to the 
writer, uch concepts a virtue, goodness, and hope seem to 
have as symbol imply the visual image of the printed 
English \ ord. Others, however, like sorrow, speed, rude-
52 THE STATICS OF SYMBOLISM. 
ncss, and color, seem in any case to follow the regular 
proce ·s in the change of category. orrow is a bent head 
with tearful eyes; speed is a horse galloping, of which the 
position of the legs i the most prominent feature ; rudeness 
i an ill-mannered, swaggering boor, and color is represented 
by a colored surface, generally of a reddish or orange tint. 
nalyze spud, for example. We become conscious of speed 
by imagining the event of moving, and moving can not be 
perceived or imagined without a thing moving. The direct 
category of peed is variation, and its word is quickly. In 
this ca e, then, we must be conscious of a) variation; b) 
event; c) thing. But the event and the thing, though present 
to con ciousness, are ignored as parts of the thought, while 
the thingness of the thing is attributed to the variation, and 
that pre entation thereby changes into the category of thing, 
- from being quickly, it becomes speed. 
hange of category is generally towards the primary 
category. Ex. Internal (quality, secondary) from in (posi-
ion, tertiary) ; dad (thing, primary) from do (event, 
econdary) ; lltiglzborhood (thing, primary) from by (position, 
tertiary.) But the change from event to quality and from 
po ition to variation are also very common. Ex. active 
from to act; 1zctlr from by. 
Comparison of tlze catL'gories. - Thing is a limited portion 
of externality, viz., space, individualized by quality. The 
content of thi portion of the continuum of space is con-
ceived as an infinite number of atoms. 
E t1l1 i a limited portion of time individualized by 
·;;ariaJum change). The content of this portion of the con-
tinuum of time is conceived a an infinitesimal fraction of 
duration. 
Hence, thing is qualified, limited, concrete number (or 
discretion). 
Hence, event is modified, limited, concrete duration (or 
continuity). 
Each category is a thought-form sufficient to include "the 
universe. Each is a philosophy. 
Thing= The universe is a collection of extended objects; 
matter= 1 laterialism. 
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Quality= The universe is a system of abstractions (pcr-
seitates), properties= Scholasticism. ( ote the supreme 
position given to substance and attribute by the ' cholastics.) 
Position (space-relation)= The universe is an organism of 
separate individuals that are yet in a sense one Leibniz' 
Monadology. (Each monad is absolutely distinct and · 
outside of every other. Still there is a monas monadum in-
cluding them all in his pre-established harmony.) 
Eiwzt=The universe is One Eleaticism, pantheism. 
Variation= The universe is an eternal variation of an 
invariable energy governed by invariable laws. The philos-
ophy of modern natural science. 
Succession (time-relation). The universe is relatio11; a 
plurality because it is a unity; is freedom, since it is self-
relation. = Neo-Hegelianism, Bostromianism. 
Concrete numb,r individ-
ualized makes tlzi11g. 
That which unites the fun -
damental discretion of space 
is quality. 
Things have in grammar 
111011/Ja, because of the fun-
damental discretion of space. 
Grammar has "rascs" and 
prepositions, because of the 
relations resulting from the 
unity introduced into the 
discretion of space by the 
category of position . 
.'·)ummmy of Catq:orfrs.- -
/l. Categories of space. 
Concrete duration individ-
ualized makes e1 ·mt. 
That which dindcs the 
fundamental continuit;• of time 
is 'i'arit1tio11. 
E\·ents have in grammar 
duration, because of the fun-
damental continuity of time. 
Grammar has "states" and 
conjunrtions, because of the 
relations resulting from the 
plurality introduced into the 
continuity of time by the 
category of succes ion. 
I. THI~G ......... That \\ hich is self-existing, and indepen-
dent. Category of exclusion, plurality, 
particularity. 
II. QUALITY ..••. • That which exists m another, and is 
depertdent. 
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III. Po TTION ..... That which exists in a higher unity of 
self and other. The contents of space 
viewed after the laws of unity belonging 
to the content of time. 
B. Categories of time. 
I. EvE T ......... That which is self-existent but still de-
pendent. Category of unity, continuity, 
universality. 
II. ARIATION OR MAN ER.-That which exists in another 
dependent being; the changing in the 
enduring. 
III. uccE SION ... That which exists in a lower plurality. 
The contents of time viewed after the 
laws of exclusion belonging to the con-
tent of space. 
P RT III. 
TIIE DYNAMICS OF THE SY IBOLISM OF 




IntrodurtorJ'· Syntax has the same relation to the 
dynamics of thought as morphology (the science of the 
forms of words; included generally in etymology) has to 
statics. Theoretically, the perfect division is: statics (or 
categories), dynamics, morphology (or "etymology") and 
syntax ; but for practical reasons it has been found better 
in the pre ent case to combine dynamics and syntax. Every 
qut:stion of syntax can be understood after the corresponding 
part of dynamics better than if syntax formed a system of its 
own. Hence Part V will be a treatment only of that portion 
f syntax which could not \\ell be treated before morphology. 
The dynamics of the symboli m of thought is the science 
o[ the combinations and uses of prcsc11tatio11s as the symbols 
of thought. yntax treats of the uses and combinations of 
words as the expressions of this symbolic thought. 
In one sense, syntax and dynamics are the same as 
morphology and the science of the categories, only seen 
[55) 
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from another point of view. The subject-matter of mor-
phology is the word as the presentation-sign; of statics 
(science o{ the categories), the presentation as a concept-
symbol. The subject-matter of syntax is the sentence (a 
combination of words), and of dynamics, the presentation-
symbol of thought (a combination of presentations). Hence 
static and morphology deal with the tools of articulate 
thought, while dynamics and syntax treat of the use of 
the e tools. But in describing the tools it is natural to 
tate for what they are used, and in treating of their use it 
is necessary to refer to the form of the tools. Bri~fly, then, 
statics is C\ description of the brick and mortar of the sym-
bolism of articulate thought ; dynamics is a treatise on the 
ma onry of such thought. 
Dynamics falls into two great divisions, construction and 
as ertion. The former contains the principles of the forma-
tion ot presentation-complexes with symbolic meanings in 
the hearer's mind; the latter is the as ertion of the relation 
between the ideal content of the proposition and reality. 
Assertion is the most vital property of the verb, and the 
mo t important function of the sentence and of the symbol 
of thought. And yet, strangely, it has been almost wholly 
ne~lected, and even mistaken for predication. To get a 
clear conception of what is meant by assertion will necessi-
tate a di ·cus ion of a question of metaphysics. 
Tlze idcc1l and real in relation to assertion. - To the un-
ophi ·ticatcd mind nothing is more obvious and indisputable 
than that there ! · a fundamental distinction between thought 
and reality. Whatever may be the merits of the ontological 
proof of God'. existence, it is certain that Anselm and his 
folio\\ er· have not made many converts by its use among 
tho. e \ ho boast of common- cnse. What is only imagined 
and conceived is by the world generally placed in sharp 
antithesis to\\ hat is real. After a few lessons from Berkeley 
and Kant, the neophyte in philosophy is apt to declare for 
the other extreme, and regard the whole universe as a clever 
dream. It is not our present purpose to attempt to sit 
in judgment upon the relative merits of idealism and 
rea\i m; our present purpose is to show that whatever 
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may be our view of the world of sense, we must still 
make a distinction between the ideal and the real, be-
tween the fancied and the real, or however we may 
denominate the distinction. As Kant said, there is a decisive 
distinction between having a hundred thalers in the pocket 
and simply imagining a hundred thalers. Even Berkeley did 
not believe that his friends would be annihilated when he 
ceased to think of them. But to formulate this distinction 
$0 that no one shall take offense is a difficult matter. First, 
however, we notice that everything is real, when taken for 
what it is; for, strictly speaking, nothing can be unreal. 
Dreams are real as dreams, an illusion is a real appearance. 
Reality lies in the judgment. If the traveler judges that 
the mirage of the desert is a mirage, he knows it as a reality; 
it is as real a presentation as the sand under his feet. 
Hence reality lies in the relation of a thing to others. Only 
when the wayfarer judges that the water in the mirage has 
such a relation to him that it can slake his thirst, does the 
appearance become in so far unreal to him. 
There is, however, another use of the word in which we 
are more directly ititerested here. We use real in contrast 
to ideal. Real is that which does not depend for its exist-
ence on any one person's thinking; not real but ideal are 
the images with \\hi ch thought works. This use of the word 
real may be faulty, but is the common usage, and the 
distinction aimed at is certainly important. The speaker 
raises a series of presentations in the imagination of the 
hearer. with the intention that the hearer shall give M them 
their true import. But not for one moment does speaker 
or hearer suppose that said images arc real. l\Iost people, 
if interrogated, would reply that these presentations are 
unreal figures that peep about inside the skull of the Ii tener. 
\ e know better, perhaps, and do not locate minds in skulls; 
but still we must recognize thee sential difference between 
the real and that which is only thought of. The listener's 
constructing an image, or the speaker's commanding it to be 
constructed, does not make it real, nor docs it make the 
meaning of the image real, nor increase the listener's knowl-
edge. If in some manner, however, the speaker can express 

I Tl s 
b d 
60 THE DYNAMICS OF SYMBOLISM, AND SYNTAX. 
press time at all. Hence the time-relations as pure time-
relations are expressed only in the assertion, w 1 e sp. . h 'l ace re-
lations are expressed in predication as well. Why this dis-
tinction between the two forms of the sense-world? 
The now of time is more important than the here of 
space. What is here to-day may again be my here to-mor-
row, and also may not be. My here and your here may 
follow different laws and be different successions. But my 
'd t'cal now and your now follow the same laws and are 1 en 1 
successions; the procession of nows is as fixed as fate, and 
can not be changed by our will, because it is the very 
essence of change. A mile from here may be an insuper-
able distance, or may be the merest trifle, as topography, 
steam, and electricity may decide. Distance north may be 
the same as distance south so far as the moving of the here 
is concerned, or it may not' be. Time is different in this .re-
spect. Motion backwards is totally impossible, mot'.on 
forward is absolutely unavoidable. Hence the obstrusive 
importance of the now compared with the here. In time, 
we refer all to our actual now, but in space, we do not at all 
so frequently refer to our actual here. The imaginary 
World in which we generally locate the presentations of ~hought is emancipated from the bondage of the now; ?ut 
'? asserting a proposition it must be given "a local h.abita-
tion and a name" in the real world and then the relat10n to 
the now must also be given. And all this plainly follows 
from the fundamental antithesis between time and space. 
All the World has the same now, no two things can have the 
ame here. When we say that two or more things are here, w~ ar~ conscious that this is an inaccuracy, since where o~e 
thing is another can not be· but there is no inaccuracy m 
saying that all the World ha; the same now. And not only 
so, but everything has had all the nows of time; for we can no~ choose but think that all that exists in the now of to -day existe~ als~ in some form during all the nows of the past, 
and '."111. exist during all the coming nows. This gives the 
now its immense superiority over the here when reality is to be located. ' 
' 
AS ERTION. 6t 
But it will be objected: do not adverbs and even prep-
ositions and nouns denote time? The word now, so often 
used in this discussion, is an axample. Do we not say, 
"after rain, sunshine", and does not the preposition after de-
note succession in time? This is all true, but none of these 
words represents time as tune; the adverbs repre ent time as 
a circumstance, and the prepositions symbolize time as a 
space relation, while substantives represent it as a thing. 
There is another class of words which express time as time, 
and these are the conjunctions, of which we have spoken. 
Besides, the property of state of the verb (the power of 
expressing an action as "perfect," actual, or potential) 
expresses a time-relation. But state is determined from the 
time of actualization of the event itself,· the verb alom repre-
sents time-relations as measured from the actual now of the 
speaker. 
As we have seen, nothing in the space-conceptions cor-
responds fully to the tense-time of the verb, as the loca-
tion in space has no reference to the assertion. If the fact 
that tense-time belongs to assertion is disregarded, the func-
tion of the demonstratives corresponds in the space-cate-
gories to the tense-time of t'he verb in the time-categories, 
since the demonstratives locate in space from the c;peaker's 
here, ju t as ten e-time locates in tir1'e from hi . now. 
The pure time-determinations of assertion are, in the 
classical and Romance languages, three; in the Germanic 
two. \Nhen three, they are past, present and future; when 
two, past and present. Tense is not synonymous with 
asserted time; it is u ed as a name of the forms of the verb 
resulting not only from time, but from state and duration 
as well. Thus the imperfect, historical perfect, and plu-
perfect are all past tenses in Latin. 
Both the present tense and the logical perfect tense are 
present in time. In English, however, tense and tense-time 
correspond; these are, present and past. 1 o compound 
forms are admitted. 
Construction.-Con struction i of two kinds, union of ele-
ments on equal terms (predication), and union of elements 
s 
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) f the other, and when one is a determination (modifier o 
therefore subordinate to it (determination). 
CHAPTER X. 
PREDICATION. 
W!tat £s asserted.-But what is to be asserted? This de-
pends on the teleology of speech; language is used for th~ 
purpose of increasing the knowledge of the listener, an 
the question then becomes: In what form must new kn~w-
ledge be presented to the mind? What would n ay "'. F ·d ish 
to tell Robinson Cru oe? ot the rock, river, sun, sea, bird, 
· s~ of palm, or hut . Those were present in the consc10nsne 
Crusoe as well as of Friday; they were uninteresting, because 
well known, old. The flight of the bird, the fall of the rock, 
the ripening of the fruit, the storm, the rain, and the sun-
rise, on the contrary, were of interest to both, because new 
and not yet known. 
Thi. psychological law of ~terest determines the very 
groundwork of the se ntence. The event alone <:an be a~ . erted, ince it al on~ is new and an addition to know-




n •rntful is not worth talking about; if absolutely nothing 
ltappmcd there would be absolutely nothing to say. We can 
not add things directly to our stock of knowledge. When 
thing enter, they must come as events (existence). The 
event of birth adds the child to the conscionsness of the 1 ~mily; the event of introduction adds the stranger to our 
Ii t of acquaintances. We can not assert a thing, but we can 
a ert the exi tence of a thing, and existence is an event. 
ubjcct and Predicate.-Assertion demands an event; we 
can not a sert without asserting an event. Here the psychol-
ogy of event is of importance. We have seen that an event ~an not be perceived or imagined without including a thing 
in the sphere of attention. This must appear in language. 
PREDlCATIO ·. 
The event is the predicate and the thing is the subject. 
The peculiarity of the event which is perhaps most striking 
is that it is thought of as having an individual existence, 
and yet an existence which is always united to an object, a 
thing. The motion and the thing moving are both one and 
two things. either the event nor the thing is the more 
important; both are of equal dignity and unite on equal 
terms. 
Definitions of predication. - Predication means, conse-
quently, the union on equal terms of a thing-pre entation 
and an event-presentation rn the hearer's world, or the union 
of a verb and its subject. It is to be noticed, that it is the 
nature of the verb that demands predication, not the nature 
of the subject. 
Tlze subject i11dudcd in tlu i·erb.- As an explicit act of the 
mind, the above applies only to modern languages. The 
ancient classical languages implied the subject in the \erb. 
Their verbs \\ere propositions, and needed not to seek a 
subject, as they included the subject. This, again, show 
the superior analysis of the moderns. The ancients did not 
abstract motion from thing moving or event from thing 
happening. A race low in intellectual development had 
better not require of the hearers of speech such a fine anal-
ysis as the eparation of the flying bird into t\~O compo-
nents, the motion and the thing. o they said" T'olat az•is," 
it flies, the bird. Volat asserts not flying simply, but flying 
thing, afld avis stands in apposition with the flying thing. 
Moi•eo does not assert motion imply, as the English 11w1·c 
does, but asserts a moving ego. Most modern language. 
have some relic of this former arrangement. E.g., the -pan-
i h tmgo, I have. But few go so far· with the Engli ·h, it 
remains a the per on and number of the verb. The per on 
and number of the verb are simply the fragments of former 
pronominal endings, and they are put to wholly new u e 
when they are employed a helps in matching the right 
verb with the right subject. In pa ·sing, we may note that 
there is an absolute distinction between predication and a -
sertion. As we have just seen, there may be explicit a er-
a 
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tion without explicit predication, and there may also be pre-
dication without assertion, as we shall presently see. 
Tiu subjat-Thc subject is a thing and represents a por-
tion of the auditor's known world. The so-called imperson-
al expre. , ions, a "it rains", "es scheint mir", "mig synes," 
are not, as some grammarians suppose,• without a "logi-
cal ubject." The drop· of the rain are the thing-sub-
ject and the falling of the rain is the event-predicate. 
There may not alway· be a di tinction explicit in conscious-
ne:., but implicitly at least both subject and predicate are 
pre. ent, at lea. t as much a· •111 any verb of Latin or 
reek. 
ince an event-pre entation can not be imagined with-
out a thing-pre. entation in which it reside , every imagined 
or perceived ·vent requires a· its. ubject some imagined or 
p rccived th111g. Therefore every word that represents 
wha b long. to the category of event must have a subject. 
That is, all\ erb. and participials have subjects. As a subject 
may be uc;ed any word that expresses a thing; such are sub-
t. ntiv and . ub. tantive participiab. The subject is never 
put in an oblique ca:e, because it is a subject. When, for 
c. ·ample, the . ubject of the 111finitive is in the accusative 
ca e, thi i not becau e it i~ ubject of an infinitive, but be-
cau th ubject of the infinitive at the same time stands in 
.in accu alive r la ion to ·omc other word of the proposition. 
"I . aw him . hoot.'' Herc lzim i. in the accusative, not be-
au c it i the . ubject of hoot, but because it is in the re-
la ion of direct object to saw. There are grave exceptions 
nd anomalte. t be . ·plained in reference to this dogma, 
bu h y may be po tponed till \\e come to objects. 
Ev ry participial ha a ·ubject, that is to say, every 
mo ion expre ed by a participial is expre sed as the motion 
of a thing moving, not a. motion "in the abstract." The 
n ce. ity of a ubjcct for every participial is a psychological 
one. true participial i the ign of a symbol that is im-
agined a an even tn reference to every subordinate ele-
ment. ·ow, an event can not be imagined \ ithout a thing 
moving. Thi moving thing is the subject. This subject 
Paul' Prinapk of I.&n«Ua,.;e, p. l:.!O. 
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may be explicitly stated, as in "dixit te imperator esse" .; or it 
may be implicitly stated. Thus the substantive qualified is 
always the subject of adjective participials. "Alexander, 
conquering a world." Here the adjective nature of conquer-
ing has in Alexander the word it qualifies, while the verbal 
nature of the participial has the same word as its subject, i. 
e ., it represents Alexander as joined to the event of con-
quering in the active voice. The substantive participials 
generally have the subject of the propo ition as subject, but 
sometimes another word. As e.g. of a subject of the propo-
sition as subject of the participial: "He lost my confidence 
by deceiving his clients." The subject of deceiving is im-
plicitly expressed in lze. "\Ve attempted to dissuade him 
from storming the fort." The ubject of dissuade is implied 
in we, the subject of the sentence, but the subject of storm-
ing i implied in lzim. It may, perhaps, be objected that 
this seems like a little too free construction, and that, po -
sibly, the subject of participials when implied, is a creation 
of the author's fancy, and not recognized by any one else. 
But witness the follo\\<ing example: "He got a fortune by 
killing his uncle." What a wretch! Is not the subject of 
killing plain enough in this construction to send a man to 
state prison for life? "He got his fortune by the death of 
his uncle." This leaves the nephew without a stain on his 
name, for deatlz, being a substantive, does not indicate a 
subject, that is, does not indicate who caused the dying. In 
the following, John appears as a good student: "By solving 
the problems in a special book, John managed to make per-
fect recitations." On the other hand: "By the olution of 
the problems in a pecial book, John managed to make per-
fect recitations." It is probable that this second John use 
a key, for solutions does not point to 70/m a its subject, as 
solving does. And this depends ultimately on the difference 
between the psychological event, which happens when a 
substantive expressing an action is used, and that \\ h1ch 
take place \\ ith the participial. As already explained, an 
event is imagined for the latter, and the event must have a 
subject; but when a ubstantive is used, the event is symbol-
ized by some thing-presentation. 1 ow, a thing can not 
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have a subject, since it can not inhere in anything not itself, 
and as a consequence, no substantive points to any other 
word as its subject. 
When the subject is neither implicitly nor explicitly ex-
pressed, it is understood as some person or thing in general. 
It may be noted that languages seem to avoid as much as 
possible making the subject of a participial nothing but the 
subjec~ of the participial. Generally the word serves also 
in another office, even when explicitly expressed. But 
there are cases of the opposite kind. "Unam partem Gal!os 
obtinerc dictum est." I [ere Gallos is subject of obtinere and is de-
pendent on nothing. But\\ hy, then, is Gallos in the accusa-
tive'! This is an anomaly that will be discussed later. The 
two words, Gallos obtimn form together a complex which is 
the subject of est. Hence obtincrl' is at once in the relation 
of a predicate to Gallus and in that of a subject to est. 
Tlzc predicate. The predicate is an event and represents 
the addition from the sphere of the unkno\\'n to the hearer's 
knowledge. This is the place to discuss a fallacy that has 
caused much confusion in grammar. Even philosophic 
writer on grammar and logic speak of the predicate as an 
attribute of the subject. 
1' O\ an attribute is conceived as \\holly dependent on 
its sub tance. In fact, it has no individual existence, but is 
\ holly subordinate and secondary in reference to its sub-
stance. II this is not so with the predicate. The predicate 
i of equal rank with the subject. It is conceived a having 
an individual existence and as being only united to another, 
not a· being nothing but a part of auother. The attribute is 
lo t in the ubstance; but \\hen subject and predicate unite, 
they do not form either a qualified subject or a modified 
predicate, but a new creature that is neither the subject nor 
the predicate, but a union of both on equal terms. Take the 
typical ·entence of all thought: T/iing ltapfms. ll ere the 
l\ ·o \ ord are of equal dignity. But if the predicate is de-
graded into an attribute \\e have happ(//ing tlii11g, in which 
the center of gravity is '\ ith tiling. 
How thi fallacy of mistaking the predicate for an at-
tribute came to be so common, is ca5ily explained on psy-
chological grounds. Our consciousness, in developing, 
always begins in the space-categories. We begin with the 
world as a collection of things, and though we soon are 
forced to recognize other categories, we constantly return to 
the primary category as to a native country and turn the 
spoils of our thought into its coffers by a "change of cate-
gory." The tendency of human thought is to construe 
everything in the space-categories. Did we not even now 
express the universe by every-tiling. The savage is said to 
personify every thought. But it is truer still that the uni-
versal characteristic of human thought is its t/zing-ifying of 
its content.* Half of philosophy is caution against undue 
tlzing-i.fication. An example o{ this unwarranted reduction 
to space is the mistaking of the predicate for an attribute. 
For this is a degradation of the predicate. Every propo-
sition, every symbolic pre entation of thought has two 
thought-forms- time and space, since it is a thing-event, but 
substance and attribute has only one form, space. Hence it 
is impossible to interpret thought in the forms of substance 
and attribute alone without reducing the temporal proper-
ties into spatial determinations; and this can not be done 
without loss, since time and pace are not tautological repe-
titions of the same form . Hence the wealth of relations ex-
pressible by the two forms together is reduced and the 
underlying principle misinterpreted. 
From the point of view of syntax, the verb is the funda-
mental word of the predicate, and from the point of view of 
dynamics, the event expressed by the verb is the funda-
mental presentation of the predicate. That i , all the other 
parts of the predicate are subordinate to the verb. The 
verb never determines the other parts of the predicate, but 
is always determined (modified) by them. 
The "Copula". It is, however, generally denied by gram-
marians that the verb to be (the substantive verb) is more 
than a bare "copula". The "predicate noun," or "predicate 
adjective," which follows, is supposed to be the predicate. It 
is argued that we are not conscious of asserting existence at 
•If there are beings of a higher order who can use the time-form a• basal, a~d thus MJ"7<tify their knowledge, how rich must be their thought compared 
with ours! 
d 
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all. Then, again, if it is admitted that the. ver~ ha~. some 
excuse for being, it is maintained that still its "idea m~st 
be of little importance, since such a small degree of attentwn 
is given to it. This is a radically wrong argument, sin:e, on 
the contrary, the general tendency is to give less attent10n to 
the fundamentals of thought and the lion's share to t~e 
uttermost determinations. More attention is given to white 
than to elephant ia the combination wh£te elephant. Still the 
governing word is the latter. Few mortals, if told tha~ a 
hapµy fate is in store for them, would center their attenti~n 
on fate. It would be happy, happy, happy that would ring. m 
their ears. For the wider and more universal a conceptwn 
is, of the less particular interest is it. But, existence is the 
widest possible predicate, and hence the emptiest o~ al'l' 
interest. Take the sentence: "The moon is our satellite. 
ls expresses here the basal conception of the predicate, but 
what care we to know that the moon exists? We knew that 
before, and even if we did not, simple existence "tells" us 
nothing about anything. Being is equal to non-being w~en 
undetermined. Hence we pay but an infinitesimal attentw~ 
to is, the assertion of existence. But this does not invali-
date the assertion of existence nor defeat its purpose. Ex-
i tence was asserted of the moon in order to have something 
to determine (or "modify") afterwards. Here zs is deter-
mined by "our satellite," another name of the same existence. 
In "The moon is bright", the adjective briglzt determines the 
a serted existence by qualifying the existence. It is a 
brigltt existence. To say that in these examples no exis-
tence is asserted, is palpably false. The thought can not 
help extending the moon in time as well as in space. To 
a ert a thought of the moon as only in space, would be a 
psychological impossibility. That we pay scant attention to 
the moon's duration is because it is so self-evident, so ad-mitte~. As is universally admitted, the verb to be does 
sometimes express existence, as in God is. Hence the law 
of par imony is against every interpretation of the function 
of to be th~t is antagonistic to the one given above. 
Tlte umon of subject a11d predz"cate.-Subject and predicate 
-----
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are not connected simply, they are united. In this respect, 
too, the "copulative verb" theory is faulty.* The verb to be 
is not a connective. Note the difference between "Cleve-
land is president", and "Cleveland and president." ot only 
does the latter group of words fail to assert anything, but 
the two presentations also remain tu10 presentations. In the 
former case the two presentations become one. There is, 
consequently, not even a similarity between the verb, even 
the "copula", and the conjunction. 
A subject and a predicate form together a predict. This 
is a new term, useful if not felicitous. If the predict is 
asserted, it becomes a proposition. Consequently, the pre-
dicts of verbs are always propositions; the predicts of 
participials never. A predict that is not asserted is treated 
in every instance as a single word, while propositions are 
combined according to laws of their own (temporal laws), 
and only exceptionally treated as simple words (after spatial 
laws). Thus, in this ca e, both propositions, and predicts 
that are not propositions, can be used as subjects. 
Voice is a property that comes under predication. It 
expresses the relation of the verb to the subject. The 
English verb has but one voice, the active ; the passive is 
supplied by the solitary passive participle. The Scandina-
vian languages are the only languages of the modern 
Germanic and Latin tongues that can boast of a true passive 
verb. Ex. Jag alskar, I love ; jag ~ilskas, I am loved. 
Contrast of Predication and Assertion.-As our usage of the 
terms predication and assertion differs from the ordinary 
one, it may be well to reiterate the distinction. Predication 
is a union of an ideal event and thing of equal rank. Our 
knowledge is not increased by predication. It has to do 
only with the images that are used as symbols, not with 
what we call the "real" world in distinction from the ideal. 
Assertion gives the relation of the ideal world to the real. It 
increases the knowledge of the listener to speech. It is the 
appearance of the logical judgment in the sphere of lan-
guage. Only what is asserted can be true or false. 
•8ee Paul's Principles of Language. 
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CHAPTER XI. 
DETERMINATION (or Modification). 
Division of det~rm£natio11.-Determination is of two ~i~ds, 
determination of words, and determination of propos1t1ons 
as such. Temporal clauses, clauses of purpose, result, etc., 
are examples of the latter ; direct objects, "adjective and 
adverbial modifiers," of the former. Determinatiun of 
words i again subdivided into three genera, internal, identi-
tive, and external. When a presentation is determined ~y 
de cribing the presentation itself, that is, by giving its 
qualitic and "differentia specifica," the determination is 
internal ; when, on the other hand, the presentation is 
determined by other presentations, as when it is said that 
t. Paul is ten miles from Minneapolis, the determination is 
external ; when a word is determined by the use of another 
term signifying the same presentation, the determination is 
identitive. Apposition is an example of identitive determ-ination. 
I11.ter11al determination by words is of two kinds, attribution 
and modification. 
Attribution is determination by adding an attribute to a 
thing. Adjectives and adjective participials determine by 
attribution. ub tantives, substantive verbs, and the parti-
cipial from ubstantive verbs can be determined by attribu-
tion. The gerund-grinder* of our younger days would have 
miled approvingly on this exposition of attribution until he 
had come to ubstantive verbs. These are not admitted by 
traditional grammar as capable of being determined by 
attribution. An example will make plain the point in dis-
pute. "Cyru was powerful." The customary analysis is 
omewhat ambiguous. Powerful is said to be a "principal 
part" of the predicate, and again an "attribute of the 
subject" through the verb. The finite verb is rightly defined 
a the mo t important part of the predicate, yes, of the 
sentence; but when cases of this class are reached, the verb, ~have seen, is called a copula simply, and is supposed 
•An npre ion from Carlyle. 
DETERMINATION. 
to have no higher value than the mathematical sign of equal-
ity. The explanation of the preceding chapter may be here 
utilized. The substantive verb, as well as every other verb, 
is the chief part of the predicate. It predicates and asserts 
existence. In the present example, was predicates and 
asserts existence of Cyrus. This is, however, the emptiest, 
because the most indeterminate of predicates. Hence the 
existence predicated of Cyrus is qualified by having an 
attribute added to it ; that is, the existence asserted i 
determined by attribution. Therefore the sentence equ:ils: 
Of Cyrus is predicated an existence determined by the 
attribute powerful. What in this theory can be que tioned? 
That the "copula" verb can express existence all agree ; 
example: "God is." The law of parsimony would require 
us to make no exception and introduce no new hypothesis 
so long.as this hypothesis can explain the facts. But how 
can existence, which belongs to the time category, be 
determined by a space determination, by attribution? 
The answer to this question is found in Ch. IV under 
"The double dimension of event." Events have space de-
terminations as well as time determinations, because of the 
peculiar obtrusiveness of space. Only the substantive 
verbs, however, go the length of taking adjectives as deter-
minations, since in existence the variation-element is le 
prominent than in motion (expressed by motion-verbs), and 
hence more attention can be given to the secondary form, 
space. 
111odification is the process of determinatio by expres ing 
the manner of that which is to be determined. Adverb 
determine, and verbs, participials, adjective , adverbs, and, 
perhaps, prepositions and conjunction , are determined by 
modification. 
ldc11tification, or identiti1•e determination i ubdivided into 
apposition and determination by a predicati·vc. 
Apposition is here given its usual meaning. The ap-
positive gives another name to the same thing a th 
word it limits. It i:, called identification, becau e it mean-
ing is identified with that of the determined word. 
Determination by a predicative.- gain we must di agree 
---- . --~--~-
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with the accepted doctrine. Traditional grammar has been 
prolix in inventing names and rules for the substantive that 
occurs in the predicate with the substantive verb. It i.s 
called a complement, either predicate, subjective, or attri-
bute complement, a predicate nominative, a predicate noun, 
and the like. The view here maintained may be brought out 
by an example: "Sherman was our leader." Of the sub-
ject, Slterman, is predicated and asserted a past existence by 
was. The existence expressed by was is then determined 
by having another name given to it, namely, leader. Leader 
and was refer to the same existence, hence leader is said to 
determine was by identification. The predicative is nothing 
but a substantive (or the substantive participial) in appo-
sition to a substantive verb, or to a participial from a 
substantive verb. It might, therefore, with propriety have 
been classed with apposition, but the great importance 
and peculiar use of the predicative seems to warrant a 
separation. Wherein they differ gramatically is shown by 
the following: Substantives and substantive participials 
can be determined by appositives; substantive verbs and 
participial from substantive verbs can be determined by 
predicatives. Substantives and substantive participials are 




Extem~l determination, or location.- A presentation may 
be det~rm111ed (modified) by having its location in space de-fine~ tn reference to other objects. "Caesar crossed the Rub~con." Here crossed is located by Rubicon. "Carry the 
w~r rnto Africa." Carry is located by Africa. All present-
ations have to do with space those of time as well as those 
of space. But all presenta~ions do not possess space in 
such a stable manner that they can be used to determine the 
.. , '.' ~ 
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location of others. As a consequence, both event and thing 
can be determined by location, but only thing can be used to 
locate other presentations. Words (and presentations) 
used to determine others by location will here be called by 
the common name of object. Location, like internal deter-
mination, may be subdivided into two classes, determina-
tions of thing and determinations of that which does not 
possess space in the absolute manner that thing does. As 
motion is the chief example, it may briefly be called deter-
mination of motion. 
Object and case are not synonymous. Case (casus, a 
bending) refers to the form of the word. Thus we say, 
properly, that the Latin has a dative case, since it has a 
special form by which to express the relation of towards, but 
the English, lacking such a form, has no dative case. But 
it would be improper to claim that the English has no dative 
objects, as object refers to the use of the word as a determi-
nator by locatioo. Ex. "Give me the book." "His native 
island is dear to the lccla11der." In these examples we have 
as good dative, or indirect, objects as any language can 
show, but we have no dative cases. Case belongs to mor-
phology, objects to syntax. 
Thing-determining objects.- These objects are expressed 
by the genitive case, and by objects with prepositions like 
of The partitive genitive is the typical thing-object, as 
well as the typical thing-ca e. Hence thing-determining 
objects may be divided as follows: (r) the typical geni-
tive object, ( 2) other genitive objects, expressing a relation 
and determination not fully genitive. 
The genitive is used with adjectives in Latin, but it is not 
hard to prove that all these adjective have a figurative mean-
ing, i.e. symbolize a quality what would be ymbolized more 
directly by some other category. Generally the direct 
category would be motion. Hence, often, that object which 
would have been some sort of accusative or dative object, if 
the adjective had been a verb, is put into the genitive. 
Ex. "SapientU:e studet, sapie111itE studwszts." In both case , 
the desire is supposed to be very intimately connected both 
with him who desires and with the object of desire; that is, 
------- - -
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it is thought as being a part of both. And the relation of 
the whole to the part is the relation of the genitive. This 
genitive we would classify under (2), since it is, afte: all, a 
violation of the category of quality to thus speak of it as a 
thing. Herein it does not strictly comply with the rules of 
the genitive. The genitive objects can be used with the sa_me 
right to determine substantive verbs and their participials 
as to determine substantives. All the languages here 
investigated agree in this. 
The genitive with verbs in Latin is simply a case of 
ellipsis, or of a cognate accusative in the verb. Ex. R~m­
i11isci virtutis. In full it would be: to remember (that which 
belongs to) virtue. We sometimes use the same symbolism 
in English; we remember (something) about a person, w_e 
think of our friends. The constructioFl is here fully geni-
tive, and it is the implied object in the verb that is deter-
mined by the genitive object. In Latin, we remember (a 
memory) of the thing, we enjoy (the iqteresting) of an 
affair. When the accusative and genitive are used, the 
same explanation holds good. "Milites necessitatis monet," ~e warned the soldiers (a warning) of the necessity. There 
is here a cognate accusative in the verb monet which we have 
rendered by a warning; this is determined 'by the genitive 
necessitatis. The genitive with verbs in Latin may accord-
ingly be ranked with genitive objects under ( 1). 
The relation from, and other circumstantial relations, a_re 
somewhat connected with the relation of the whole to its 
p~rts. In ordinary experience, we are seldom forcibly re-
minded_ of the relation of a whole to its parts except through 
s~paration . This practical, close connection has been recog-
nized b~ the Greek language, whose genitive case expresses b~th t_hmg-determination (whole to part) and motion-deter-
mination (circumstantial relation as separation). ~onse­
quently, we must say, that the Greek genitive case is not alwa~s used for genitive objects, but sometimes for circum-
stantial ~bjects. Some prepositions seem always to denote 
the relation °~ an object to a thing as of, von. Others s_e~m 
to hav~ received their meaning, like the Greek genitive 
case, without reference to our fundamental distinction. 
•• , ("t ·r 
DETERMINATION :-OBJECTS. 75 
T!te motion-determining objects.-These may be classified 
as follows: (I) Accusative objects, (a) the typical accusa-
tive, the direct object; ( b) other accusative objects; ( 2) 
dative objects, (a) the typical dative, the indirect object; (b) 
other dative objects; ( 3) circumstantial objects, as ablative, 
locative, instrumental, and the like. 
T!te accusative object represents that presentation in per-
ception or imagination which terminates the motion of 
another. Accordingly, to begin with, it is thought of as 
that which receives the motion. The motion when deter-
mined by an object, is not thought of as destroyed but as 
transformed; and so this object is supposed to possess the 
motion as result. The direct object is, therefore, the truest 
accusative object. The cognate accusative is but a species 
of the direct object. This is too apparent to need illustra-
tion. There are other accusative objects which lack some-
thing in the full meaning of the accusative. Thus the Latin 
accusative of limit. "Romam <Jenit." "Ad temp/um rcdit." 
English: "He came home." "He wcntto Africa." This accu-
sative marks the termination of motion, and i in so far truly 
accusative; but it does not denote that which receives the 
motion as result; herein it fails in the full meaning of the 
accusative, and hence it comes under ( b) of the accusative 
objects. The medium through which a motion pa ses, 
terminates it gradually, and as physics proves and common 
sense believes, receives the motion as a result. A ball pass-
ing through the air, or a blow in the water, illustrates what 
is meant. Therefore, the medium of a motion may be con-
sidered a that which absorbs and terminates the motion. 
Latin: "Decem am1os re.xi!," and also in Engli h, "He ruled 
ten years." Here ten years is symbolized a the medium in 
which the activity of ruling spent itself. KA.iapxo~ 
i?toA.eµEL ?tavra rov fJlov. Here the life-time of Clear-
chus is considered to be the medium which absorbed and 
terminated the warring of Clearchus. When this accusative 
(in languages quoted here) is used without a preposition, it 
may generally be classed under (a), but when a preposition 
occurs, generally under (b). This is not so in the pani h, 
however, where a preposition sometimes "governs" the direct 
• 
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object of the verb. No preposition in these languages ex-
presses the pure accusative relation, and the fact that a 
preposition is used indicates that the relation is not pure.ly 
accusative. The accusative of specification and the adverbial 
accusative in Latin and Greek admit of similar explanations. 
Capita velamur. Kaµvw -rov.s ocpBaA.µov.s. The veiling. is 
supposed to affect the head accusatively, likewise the laboring 
the eyes. Pure accusatives they are not, as there must be a 
change of symbolism in the sentence in order to make the 
relation accusative. Some of these accusatives can be best 
explained as linguistic make-shifts. Whoever first used 
them, felt it in a dim, ill-defined manner that the determina-
tion he wished to add, had a very close connection with the 
idea to be limited. So he symbolized the determination by 
the accusative object, as this is in some respects among 
objects the 'most intimate determination. The English 
"accusative case" after prepositions is only a chameleon's 
skin, which continually changes its colors of relation. In 
English it has come to be equivalent simply to a mark of 
dependence, and with a preposition may stand for any rela-
tion. The so-called accusatives without prepositions, which 
e~press time, distance, price, and the like, are no accusa-
tives at all, neither cases nor objects. Ex. "It was a yard 
long, and cost us a shilling." There is no case-ending, and 
the relation is evidently circumstantial. But it is easy to 
see how the grammarians came to call it accusative. They 
fir t de~lined the English noun into three cases, making the 
accusative and the nominative alike. Then they were led 
to conf.use the meaning of object and case, since else their 
accusative case of the noun would ha~e meant nothing. 
The·y· found certain nouns obviously in a dependent 
position but. without prepositions, and with the form com-
mon to nominative and accusative. Nominative they could 
not be, as that form does not denote subordination; there-
fore they called them accusative. 
. The ~se of the accusative as the sub1'ect of the infinitive 
1s expla d · · t 
. me in most cases by the fact that the sub1ec 
stands m an a · . d · the ccusative relation to some other wor in 
sentence. But h h · . . . . · f the w en t e infinitive with its sub1ect orms 
• 
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subject of the proposition, such an explanation is precluded. 
Te esse servum dicitur. Why is te in the accusative? To-
gether with esse it forms the subject of the verb. This 
seems to be simply an anomaly, a mistake of the logic of 
language. Historically, it is probable that at first infinitives 
with their subjects were used in subordinate positions where 
the subject did stand in some accusative relation to a super-
ordinate element, as, "dicit te esse servum." By analogy, 
(the mother of one-half of language) this case was retained 
when the subject stood in no such dependent relation; and 
instead of rectifying the error, it has been perpetuated, per-
haps because we feel that the subject of an infinitive is not 
of the same dignity as the subject of a verb, and ought to 
bear some badge of inferiority. 
Tlte dative object denotes that towards which a motion is 
tending, and is accordingly the object of direction, e peci-
ally direction towards. Th~ relation of the person who 
receives the less material effect of an action is generally 
symbolized by this object. The truest dative object i the 
so-called indirect object. The dative object offers few dif-
ficulties. In passing, it may be remarked that the dative 
forms used with substantive verbs ( Tibi est pater. Est militi-
bus curce. Er ist mir freundliclz. 'Ovoµa i<Hl pm ~-rrzxo.s) 
are datives of the (a) class, but the dative use with adjec-
tives, nouns, and adverbs are dative objects of the (b) cla s 
( TpHflv i'run 77:poTEpov. Facilis descensus A1•erno), as a 
change in the symbolism of the governing word from rest 
to motion is nece ary to make the dative intelligible. 
It has already become apparent that object might be 
divided and subdivided into an almost interminable number 
of classes. Thus, "other" dative objects, i but an excuse 
for performing no further subdivisions of the dative. 
trictly speaking, every preposition is followed by an 
object peculiar to it, and therefore every preposition has a 
class of objects of its own. Yes, in some languages, as in 
Greek, certain prepositions have two or three cases of their 
own, as a dative and an accusative. But it would be im-
practicable to carry the division so far, invent names, and 
describe them all in an essay like this. Besides, the classes 
------ ---~~ 
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already treated are by far the most important, so it is no 
violation of symmetry to class all the remaining objects to-
gether as 
Circumstantial objects.-Their relations are not so intim~te 
as those of the accusative and dative. Such are the ablative 
proper (from), the instrumental (a figurative use of the 
relation by, neighborhood), the locative, and several others. 
Double objects, etc. - There are certain dogmas about 
double objects, "objective complements," and the like, which 
may well come up for consideration here. The two accusa-
tives, one of the person and one of the thing, make in Lati.n 
an innocent construction. Pliilosopltiam vetustam me doczttt. 
In English, we would think pltilosoplty as the direct object and 
me as the indirect, since we have no special dative case; but 
the Romans thought both as accusative objects, as the case-
endings show. But they and we get into trouble in turning 
the expression from the active into the passive, for but on.e 
of the two accusatives can be used as subject ; the other is 
left as accusat ive object. The person is made s ubjec t and 
the thing is left in the accusative. There, however, we have 
the anomaly of an accusative after a passive verb. This 
hows the necessi ty of a double symbolism, and conse-
quently, that this object is not a pure accusative, bu( com.es 
under (b). The other case of two accusatives in Latin, 
that of the same person or thing, occurs in all languages 
here noticed as the "predicate objective," or "objective 
predicate complement." This has been made a fearful and 
wonderful thing by the parsing-master. Let us take the 
mo t typical. "They made him captain ." The g rammars 
tell us.th~t captain is an "essential part" of the predic~te, 
and. lttn~ is direct object. This analysis is too ind efin ite ; 
be ides it may or may not be interpreted so as to be true. 
Here there is plainly an ellipsis; and we shall do well to 
take another example first, which is free from this difficulty. 
"They forced him to become captain." Subj., tltey; pred., 
forced; direct object, the predict ltim to become; predicative 
of ~ecome, captain. othing is unwarranted in this expla-nati~n. That an infinitive with the accusative may be used 
as direct object must be admitted. Likewise, that an infini-
----------~~-
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tive can take a predicative. As the subject of the infinitive 
is in the accusative, it follows that the predicative should be 
so too. Now the analysis of our first problem is self-evident. 
Subj., tlzey; pred., made; direct object, lzim to be, be being 
the infinitive of a substantive verb understood after lzim. 
Predicative of the infinitive be is captain. Surely we have as 
good right to understand an infinitive here as, say, a subject 
for an imperative. The absence of the form does not prove 
the absence of the distinction. Besides, the infinitive is not 
absent except in a few, stereotyped, much worn, idiomatic 
expressions, which, however, recur so often that, though 
elliptical, they have been taken for normal and complete 
expressions by uncritical grammarians. 
Prepositions and objects. - We can not leave the object 
without protesting against the very common formula in 
parsing: "object, or substantive, govemed by a preposition." 
This expression has a false philosophy behind it, as it makes 
the relation between the verb and its object the same as 
between the substantive and the preposition. 'othing 
could be further from the truth. The preposition is not the 
superordinated element in relation to the object, as the verb 
is ; nor is the preposition determined by the object, a the 
governing word always is. The preposition neither deter-
mines nor is determined by the object, but shows imply in 
wlzat manner the superordinate word is determined by the 
object in question. The better grammars of to-day have 
noted and rectified the error. But the average parsing-
master has not. But we must forgive the parsing-master. 
His view of grammar is as "practical" as it is uninspiring. 
Grammar is to him the science-no, the art, that teache the 
schoolboy where to place his endings in his Latin com po ·i-
tions. So he is always on the lookout for a cue, never for a 
principle; but he can not prevent his language from imply-
ing an unconscious philosophy. He has found it a never 
failing rule that the substantive after per is in the accusative, 
and as a cue to one who attempts to write a language after 
rules and not after instinct, this is of considerable value; but 
now, he concludes that in some way per is the cause of the 
accusative after it, that it is per that makes the following 
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word accusative. This is wrong. The cause of the accusa-
tive ending is the same as that of the preposition, na1'.1ely, 
the limiting relation of the object to the word determm.ed. 
To say that the preposition governs the object is like say.mg 
that the violets of spring govern the roses of summer, JUSt 




Determi11o.tion by Propositions.-We have now arrived ~t 
the second and last grand division of .determination ( "mod1-
fication"). The element used as a determination is no 
longer a word, or a phrase used as a word, but a whole 
proposition. When predicates and propositions are used a.s 
ubject , objects, predicatives, and the like, or with preposi-
tion , they are u ed as if they were simply words. The case 
i different when the propositions condescend to be used as 
determinations in their own right and name, so to speak. 
Then other laws are followed and other principles obtained. 
Here it is well to bear in mind the following principle. 
\: ithin the proposition there is no true time-relation. All 
relations are there symbolized as space-relations. The 
proposition as a whole is then located in time by the verb. 
But between different propositions there are sometimes true 
relation of time. 
The fir .t di tinction is between proposition determinin~ 
word (relative clauses), and proposition determining proposi-
tion (conjunctive clauses). 
Propositio11s determining words, or the relative clauses.-
The relativ~ word, if a substantive, stands in apposition to 
some word in the chief clause, and, at the same time, fulfills 
some office in the dependent clause. If an adj<:ctive, it is an 
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attribute in both clauses; if an adverb, a modifier in both. 
Hence the essential thing is that the two clauses should 
possess a word in common, and that this should be a relative 
word. The whole force of a dependent clause then becomes 
a determination of the word in the chief clause which is 
determined by the relative. 
Propositions determinillg proposition.- ( I) ,}fulual deter-
mi11atio7l.- The co-ordinate conjunction , as truly a any 
other, express a succession of pres•ntation-complexe . 
These complexes, now elevated to the rank of propositions 
by the verb, sustain some relation to one another, and there-
by they mutually determine one another; thi relation is 
expressed by the co-ordinating conjunctions. Hence the 
relation of co-ordinate propositions to one another is that 
of mutual determination. 
( 2) Determi1latio1l by subordinate propositions.-Our thoughts 
must, of course, be thought in succession. Thus, if\ e think 
of the fall of the Roman empire and the causes of it, the 
decline of Roman virtue, and the inAux of Barbarians, \ e 
must think these three thoughts in ucce ·sion. nd, a far 
as results are concerned, it matter· little in what order they 
come in the succession. But this is not a succe sion of import-
ance for symbolism. The mind place it ymbol in a cer-
tain succession at will, and the order in which the ymbol 
are sugge ted to the mind has nothing to do with the order 
in symbolism. \ hat is last thought of, may well be placed 
fir t. Thus, in the example above, the cause , inAux of bar-
barians and decline of virtue, are invariably thought in the 
symbol as preceding the re ·ult, the fall of the empire. It i 
of no importance which was fir t thought of, cau e or effect, 
cause is still always placed in the symbol as going before 
effect. The mind accordingly place · the ymbol in any 
ucce ion it pleases· but succe · ion is an exceedingly 
simple relation, being nothing but a faultle s proce ion . 
. The determining and the determined proposition are both 
members in the same line, and mu t be either before or af-
ter. till, by this simplest of relations in the sense-world, 
men ymbolize t he profounde t relations in the concept-
world. Not only so, but the mind kno\ ·s these highe t re-
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of thi cla s of determination, 
general grammar, seem impo -
c pr ion "doubl symholism" occur quite frequent-
~· ch P r but po ibly it, meaning, from the P y-
ch I •c I id • h not been made clear. rdinarily the 
ymbol of thoui;h , ·hich i an image or part of an image, 
I n o ne ca gory of ymbol , and to one only, 
h ut he time it i employed. But sometimes the 
chan ~ from one category to another, and still the 
~ con 1der it the same ymbol. This, which is the 
c c ption ith o her ·ord i the fundamental law of parti-
cipi \'hat occur a a' rule with participial , may hap-
n e. ceµ ion \\ ith other words. \ hen for example, 
a~ti e i determined by an object tha~ belongs to a 
hich implies motion in the determined ' ord, this 
std 
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must, \ hen not explicable a ellip i , be explained a a c e 
of double ymboli. m. In relation to that object the ub-
tantive symbol must be thought a a motion. ow, it ma 
be objected, that a thing-pre entation can not b chan 
a motion-pre entation, and that when '·e think o, e re 
mistaken; what '·e take for a change i reall a ub titution, 
the pre. entation i no long r the ame. To '·hich ma b 
replied that, strictly peaking, a pre enta ion h no iden-
tity to lo e. In , hat. en e i the image I mak in m mind, 
of the moon, identical with the ima I made • f 
aid luminary? r, if I teadil k ep n im 
bef re the mind for ten con ecu iv c nd , i 
the tenth econd the ame in ma eri I a th 
fir t econd? The qu . tion i unan \ rabl b 
The only re on \\ h a pre enta ion i call d in 
t o con. ecuti e econd of tim , i b cau 
ymbol for the ame meaning. 






a) the real mode, indicative, 
b) ideal modes, 
( aa) subjunctive, 
( bb) optative, 
(cc) imperative. 
II .-Tense-time. 









I .- of words. 
(a) internal determination, 
( aa) attribution (adjectives, etc.), 
( bb) modification (adverbs, etc.), 
d 
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b) identitive determination, 
(aa) apposition, 
(bb) determination by predicative, 
c) external determination, 
(aa) of thing by thing, 
(bb) of "motion" by thing, 
a) accusative objects, 
aa) direct object, 
bb) other accusative objects, 
b) dative objects, 
aa) indirect objects, 
bb) other dative objects, 
c) circumstantial objects, 
2.-of propositions, 
a) proposition determining word, or relative 
clauses. 
b) proposition determining proposition, or con-
junctive clauses, 
(aa) mutual determination, or co-ordinate 
clauses. 
(bb) determination by subordinate propositions, 
or "dependent" clauses. 
PART IV. 
MORPHOLOGY, OR THE PARTS OF SPEECH. 
CHAPTER XIV. 
PROLEGOMENA TO MORPHOLOGY. 
Statics treats of the nature of symbolic presentations, 
morphology of the consequent classes and properties of the 
words in language. We shall first consider some principles 
of interpretation. 
Wltat is a word.~-Up to this point we have had no .occ~­
sion to refer to speech directly, except in Part III, which is 
a composite of syntax and the dynamics of symbols. If all 
treatment of syntax had been deferred until after morphol-
ogy, this chapter would have been absolutely the first 
place where the problem of this thesis dealt with language 
directly. The preceding chapters would have been solely a 
treatise on the symbolism of thought. 
The question, what is a word, is generally decided for us 
by the compositor and the spelling-book, but it would be 
rash to ascribe infallibility to either. Besides, written lan-
guage alone separates words into distinct objects, orally we 
speakbyclausesinthismanner, as also the ancients wrote. 
Since, accordingly, the spatial and temporal separation of 
words is artificial, the question is pertinent, Are words 
natural units of speech at all? To answer this question, let 
[86] 
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us ask another: Whether it be a natural or an arti6cial 
unit, what is a word? "The sign of an idea," is the English 
reply: but since "idea" may mean almost anything, this is 
not very definite. The following substitute is more definite: 
Words are the signs of symbolic presentations. Hence the 
unit of language as the system of signs of presentations, is 
the word. ow, it is wholly arbitrary what we are to take 
as the unit of a presentation. Even a triangle consists of 
parts, and these again of smaller parts. Hence in the pre-
sentation as such we can not find the unit. The unit must 
consequently lie with the word itself as a sign; and the 
definition of one word becomes: One word is a sound com-
plex or character-complex that can not be further reduced 
or simplified without losing or changing its character as a 
presentation-sign. Let us, therefore, subdivide language and 
see how far we can continue the subdivision before the 
nature of language as a sign-system is destroyed. The unit 
thus arrived at is the word. Take, for example, the expre -
sion, "silvery clouds." Interposing a word, we have, 
"silvery, fleecy clouds." v e notice that both "silvery" and 
"clouds" retain their significance. Hence, we have here at 
least two words. But "silvery" may perhaps be two \ ord . 
"Sil, fleecy, very clouds." Here we notice that "silvery" 
has lost its meaning by the division. Hence" ilvery" i the 
unit, and is but one word. Generally, the fact that the or-
dinary writer separates the \ ords, shows that in the consci-
ousness of the majority each word as separately written, 
stands as an integral sign. ometimes, however, we should 
be deceived by following this rule. Thus the infinitive with 
"to" is one, not two words; "to do," for example, is treated 
as one word, and it is not correct to introduce any word be-
tween the "to" and the infinitive; the "to" has in this case 
no meaning as separated from the infinitive. To be sure, it 
might be mistaken for the preposition "to," but a moment's 
thought on the subject will show that it has here no prepo-
sitional force whatever. It is only the sign of the infini-
tive. 
It seems warranted, therefore, to establish the following 
principle, the complement of the former: Any group of 
-
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sounds that, without the addition of other sounds, has a 
meaning, or that-does not require any particular sound or 
group of sounds either before or after it to make sense in 
discourse, is a word. Thus is, can, has are words, not parts 
of words, as the compound-verb theory would have us be-
lieve. As long as a group of sounds can preserve its in~i­
viduality as a word, and consequently can be placed in 
different groupings without losing its force, we must attribute 
an individual signification to such a group and treat it as a 
word-unit. It is incumbent on the grammarian to determine 
what this signification is. All "compound" verbs, etc., are 
consequently cases of incomplete grammatical analysis. . 
The grammarian lumps "have been taken" or "captt 
sumus" together, and calls them one word, thus treacherously 
getting out of his bounden duty to explain the relations that 
subsist between "have" and "been," "been" and "taken." To 
treat a whole phrase as one word is evidently no explana-
tion either of the phrase or of the words that compose it. 
The grammarian's duty is to explain all the functions and 
relations of words. And he has not performed this duty by 
simply explaining the historical route by which the word 
has descended from antiquity to us. To say, for example, 
that once, long ago, the three words have been taken had 
each a signification, but that this is no longer the case be-
cause the _expression is "petrified," is a false pleading. If 
this were a truly petrified expression, in which each single 
word had no sense, but only the whole combination, it would 
plainly be impossible to insert any words between have and 
been, been and taken, without destroying the meaning. But 
we can say, have never been successfully taken, and still the 
w~rd~ preserve their individuality. Hence we have the 
principle: Two or more words must never be taken for 
one. 
Tlze e~istence of a word form in a language is sure evidence 
of the existence of a corresponding thought form; but the 
absence of the word form does not necessarily mean the 
absence of the thought form. In other words, we must often 
"und t d" ers an and "supply" links in the chain of the sen-
tence. Thus, though no form of the verb, nor any special 
~------------------~1111111 
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word denotes the subject in an imperative sentence, the sub-
ject is yet rightly understood. Also the fact that no dative 
case-form is found in English does not prove that there are 
no dative objects. 
To know and to know t!tat we know are not the same. 
"Ego is conscious of A," is not equal to ·•Ego is conscious 
of A+ego." So little attention may, also, be paid to a fact 
of consciousness that it disappears from memory almost 
immediately. Thus I may at this second be infinitesimally 
conscious of a certain stroke of the pen, but because I pay 
so very little attention to this movement, I forget it the 
next moment. (Hereby we do not intend to deny the 
totally unconscious character of some habitual movements.) 
That I should forget such <t movement is only natural. 
Memory is always weaker than the percept remembered. If 
now, this was barely able to keep itself above the threshold 
of consciousness, it stands to reason that its memory will 
inevitably sink below the threshold at once. Consequently 
the easy and popular argument, "we are not conscious of 
having such an idea," is worthless in its usual form. 
Tlze center of interest is not al ways on what is psychologi-
cally and grammatically the word highest in rank. Thus in 
the sentence, "He found a gold coin," gold is probably the 
word that interests speaker and hearer most, and that con-
sequently gets the lion's share of the attention. But 
grammatically the words !te found are of most importance. 
To these words, all the others have the relation of determi-
nations only. The perfect distinction of the emphasis of 
interest from the rank of words and presentations in the 
dynamics of thought is so apparent that it is surpri ing that 
any one was ever misled by it. Yet the "copula" theory 
testifies otherwise. In fact, however, the very opposite 
principle may be deduced: The vividness of a presentation 
in consciousness is generally in £nverse ratio to its rank in 
the sentence. 
Teleological eco11omy.-The presentation-complex by which 
the hearer chooses to symbolize his thought after he has 
grasped the meaning of the speaker is seldom the same as 
the one by means of w!t£clz he understands the speaker, the 
.. 
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one which is built up piece by piece in the auditor's mind 
while listening to speech. The former is generally the 
simpler. Thus when the speaker says, "He has great gifts," 
the auditor must imagine "he" as possessing something, b~t 
at the end of the sentence he is at liberty to exchange this 
indirect symbol for a simpler, perhaps one · that might ~e 
represented by "A talented man." This latter, or teleolog1c, 
image absorbs all the attention, and the circumlocutory way 
by which we arrived at it is forgotten. This tendency to 
withdraw the most of attention from the images raised by 
the speaker as soon as they are understood, and to construct 
a simpler image that represents in a preferable way the 
"sum and substance" of what is said, may be called teleolog-
ical economy. The symbol constructed by the speaker in 
the mind of the auditor may be called the primary symbol of 
thought ; the symbol by which the listener chooses to 
represent the thought to himself afterwards may be called 
the secondary symbol. 
CHAPTER XV. 
WORDS BELONGING TO THE CATEGORIES OF SPACE. 
Substantives. - The signs of the first category, things, 
constitute the first class of words, substantives. A su bstan-
tive always stands for a space occupying presentation, but 
this presentation may symbolize anything. Thus the word 
"r~lation," when used in a sentence, is represented for the 
mmd by ~ome counter, very often the printed form of the 
word, which may then be located in or between other things. 
It w.as by mistaking this symbol of relation for actual 
rela~ion that the Eleatics got one of their famous proofs of 
the impossibility of plurality. A and B must be separated 
by som~thing if they are to be different things. Let us call 
that which separates C. But then A and C must again be 
separated by D in order not to be identical and so on ad 
infinitum, that is, it is absurd to believe in plu~ality. This is 
......... ~-------~~~------< 
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equivalent to: A and B must be separated by a relation; if 
a relation is considered a thing, it must occupy space, and 
itself stand in some relation to A; this new relation is con-
sidered as another thing, and so on. The symbol has been 
mistaken for the meaning. The very nature of a relation is 
not to occupy space, but to exist in the higher unity of the 
two objects, but when thinking of a relation we must symbol-
ize it by some spatial counter, by some symbol of sense. So 
what the Eleatics proved is the inadequacy of the category 
of thing to express the full import of actuality, and not the 
impossibility of motion and plurality. In language we 
have nothing directly to do with the meaning of thought, 
but only with its symbol. Language is symbol-construction. 
Hence, all substantives are treated as if they verily stood 
for space-objects, as they do in the sphere of symbols. 
Nouns and pronouns.-Substantives are divided into nouns 
and pronouns. Here it becomes necessary to break at once 
with popular grammar, which lacks nothing so much as 
logical classification. The difference between quality and 
thing is considered great enough to warrant the establish-
ment of different parts of speech, nouns and adjectives; then 
in the next breath adjective pronouns and substantive pro-
nouns are classed together as pronouns. Now, if the 
difference between quality and thing is the ground of divi-
sion, there certainly is as great difference between tltis and 
me, ltt'c and me, as between blue and sky; and one logical 
way of classifying these words would be to make four parts 
of speech, namely, nouns, adjectives, substantive pronouns, 
and adjective pronouns. But then it would also be necessary 
to separate adverbs into two classes, adverbs and abverbial 
pronouns (relative, interrogative, and demonstrative adverbs); 
for if the general and substitutive force of the pronouns is 
sufficient as a basis for separate classification in words like 
tltis and lze, the same property in an adverb like tlzen or 
where ought to receive an equal honor. But this property 
of being general signs is not of so great and distinctive 
importance in the sentence as to warrant the establishment 
of separate parts of speech. · Hence we shall class nouns 
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and substantive pronouns together as substantives, and use 
"nouns" and "pronouns" ·as subdivisions of substantives. It 
follows that in this system, pronoun must always stand for 
"substantive pronoun." 
Save the division into common and proper nouns, there 
is no classification of nouns of great importance from the 
standpoint of symbolism. The subdivisions of pronouns are 




Under representative, we include "personal," "reflexive," 
and such "indefinites" as are of a substantive nature, as man 
and etwas in German, and on in French ; the classification 
becomes, then, very simple and we hope, rational. Pronouns 
that simply represent a thing - presentation by a general 
name, are called representative pronouns. The relative is. a 
pronoun which stands in apposition with its antecedent in 
the chief clause, and therefore detennines it by identification 
(see Syntax), and in addition is the sign of a thing - presen-
tation in the dependent clause. In English we have one 
truly substantive relative who· the other relatives are ad-
' , jectives. Latin has no substantive relative; Greek, one ; 
German, two, wer and was. The interrogative pronouns are 
"relatives in search ot an antecedent." Ex. English, wlto; 
Latin, quis (not qui, which is an adjective). The demonstra-
tives, and generally the indefinites, are by their very meaning 
necessarily adjectives. The criterion to apply is to at-
tempt to supply a substantive after the pronoun, and notice 
w~et~er it consents to the position of an adjective. (See 
Principles of Interpretation at the beginning of this chapter.) 
. u~b~r is the fundamental property of the substantiv~, 
smce it is the fundamental of thing. This property is 
expressed directly by "number" of substantive and, with 
"chan~e ~f category," by numeral adjectives. 
. ~d7ectives.-The category of quality has the adjective as 
its sign Accordingly, every adjective denotes a quality of 
a space-occupying presentation as a taste smell color, form, 
location, or number, (thought ~f as quality). As a symbol 
WORDS BELONGING TO THE CATEGORIE OF PACE. 93 
it may very well stand for that which is not at all a quality 
of a sensible object. Adjectives are of two kinds: 
!.-Special, (green, quick), 
2.-General, (adjective pronouns), 





The representative adjectives are the signs of some very 
general attributes, as that of being an object (some), of 
being the neuter gender (n), and the like. The rest of the 
general adjective represent the space-position of the pre-
sentation as a quality, the demonstratives simply for the 
purpose of identification, the relatives to add a dependent 
clause, the interrogative to express a question. The definite 
article is the weakest, because the most common of the 
demonstratives. This is so self-evident that we shall not 
attempt a needless demonstration. 
Expressions for space-relations are demonstratives, preposi-
tions, and "case" of substantives. The space-determination 
of demonstrative corresponds to the time-determination of 
tense-time, since demonstratives determine from the lure of 
the speaker, and tense from his now. Case corresponds to 
"state" of verbs, and prepositions correspond to conjunc-
tions. 
When the rea on for expressing the relation between two 
presentations is to locate the one by the other, the relation 
is expressed by prepositions and cases. These locating re-
lations are of two clas ·es: 
I. Relation of thing limiting thing. 
2. Relation of thing limiting motion. 
The former relation is expressed by the genitive ca e and 
prepositions like of, von, and de. This relation of thing to 
thing expressed by the genitive is the relation of the rest of 
the whole to a part. The partitive genitive is a typical 
example; certain uses of the genitive are elliptical or in some 
measure figurative. Ex. JYlagnum 111tmerum militum. Here 
militum expresses the whole and mtmerum the part, and the 
1111-~-------------------...........-
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case-ending um expresses the relation of this whole to the 
part. Likewise in Tcilv 'A.817vcdmv oz' apuHoz, the ending 
mv expresses the relation of the whole, to-wit, Athenians, to 
the part, the noblest. "Plato's Dialogues." Here Plato is 
supposed originally to consist, not only of his personality, 
but also of that which belongs to him; hence his dialogues 
are also a part of Plato, and the 's represents the relation of 
the whole to the part. Possession, a rather figurative use of 
the case, has practically monopolized what little is left of 
the only oblique case of nouns in the English language. It 
i well to observe that through this whole discussion the 
spatial implications of the language used, must be taken 
quite literally, and not figuratively. Every preposition, as 
\ ell as every case, expresses, in every instance, a relation 
that in the psychological event in the presentation-world 
which serves as a symbol, is always a space-relation. On 
this symbol, however, we generally waste so little conscious-
ness that we scarcely remember it, since we let the symbol 
at once lead us to its meaning. 
The Latin case-scheme may be exhibited as follows:* 
A. Thing to thing. 
I. Genitive-whole to part. 
B. Thing to motion. 
I. Dative-direction towards. 
2. Ablative proper-direction from. 
3· Locative and instrumental ablative-neighbor-
hood. 
4. Accusative-limit of motion, that which re-
ceives the motion. 
The Latin language is more logical in this respect than 
the Greek. The Greek scheme is the following: 
1_. Genitive- relation of thing to motion or thing- sep-
aration, whole to part. 
2. Dative-neighborhood. 
--2:_ Accusative-limit. 
g:i;t0 \{ S.Clark, of the University of Minnesota uses a very simple and s.ug-
and :~cu1a~:am to represent the relations express~d by the dative, ablative. represent~1d 1be c:~es _int Latin. The dative, aud in some cases the abl~t.iv,~, ~c 
motion re t · Y potn • a!1d the accusative by a line. "In urbe vi.nt. 0 
line "An 1 in, _ hence a point. "In ttrlJeni venit." hl otion represented by a poi~t in ti~oeprtmo J?Ollt urbem ~onditam, hastes, etc." Here' an no P!imo is tbe 
annum. is the ~~ct:~chf ~<_lmetdh 1 n_g hap~ened. "Unu1n annuni regnav1.t." gn1rnt 
0 1me unng which the reign took place. Hence a ne, 
-----~------~~~---........ 
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The German language is in this respect very similar to 
the Greek. The English and Swedish scheme is as follows: 
A. Thing to thing. 
I. Genitive-possession. 
B. Thing to motion (in pronouns only). 
I. Accusative-limit of motion. 
As the French, Spanish, and Italian have no cases, save 
some remnants in the pronouns, further analysis is un-
necessary. 
Prepositions do not govern cases. The case-ending is 
not caused by the preposition. Both are expressions of the 
same relation, and hence essentially a tautology. In some 
cases, the endings are simply useless survivals, as the prepo-
sition amply indicates the relation to be expressed. Some-
times the case-ending may be of use as indicating of which 
word the preposition expresses the relation. This has 
been wrongly considered by the average school grammars, 
as the only use of "cases governed by prepositions." Lan-
guages of such finished symmetry as the Greek have 
avoided tautology in most instances by dividing up the 
work of signifying the relation, between the case and the 
preposition. Thu , uelrai id rc.Jv 7tErpc.Jv, lies on the 
rocks, 7tl7trez bd ras 7th pas, falls on the rocks. E7tl 
means, in both cases, on, but with the genitive rest 011, and 
with the accusative motion u11to. 
Prepositions in modem languages.-The representation of 
space relations by prepositions instead of by case-endings 
marks a great advance in the logic of language. It intro-
duces the epoch of thought when man rose from the cate-
gory of thing to that of relation. To invent, use, and 
understand a case-ending it is only necessary to apprehend 
that a thing is in a different condition when receiving the 
effects of a motion (acc.) than when not so doing ( nom. ), 
when approached ( dat.) than when departed from (gen. or 
ab!.); it is not necessary to abstract from the objects entirely, 
and consider the relation in itself. That is, it is unnecessary 
.for apprehending a case-form to distinguish a relation and 
the thing related. But this was exactly what had to be 
done before prepositions could enter language. They could 
-
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never sustain their individuality until the hearer of speech 
could think a relation as a relation. When the first prepo-
sition was uttered, man had learned to abstract position 
from thing. Therefore, the English language is a far more 
developed tongue than the Latin, which never quite knew 
what to do with its few prepositions. D o we then mean to 
say that the great Roman thinkers are surpassed by the men 
in an English workshop? Far from it! Every system of 
symbolism must be suited to the average listener, not to the 
exceptional thinker. Then it must never be forgotten that 
languages are already old heirlooms, ancient instruments, 
when their best thoughts are expressed. Not the age of 
Cicero, but the age of the Twelve Tables drew the out!ines 
of Latin. Chaucer, not Shakes peat e, had a hand in making 
the essentials of English-yes, the great fundamenta go 
much farther back, to the dark, dank forests of Germany. 
Accordingly what we assert is this: that the Latin language 
is a more puerile language, more suited for the world's 
intellect before its beard was grown, than the English. And 
this the Latin is, because at its formative period the average 
Roman listener was less intellectually advanced than the 
Anglo-Saxon listener to English at its formative period. 
Hence, Latin would make an excellent nursery language, 
and would, doubtless, be more speedily learned by infants 
than English. 
Prepositions are not only superior as standing for more 
advanced thinking, but also because they make possible 
greater exactness of speech. Half a dozen case-forms can 
not possibly express as many and as finely differentiated 
relations as the numerous prepositions of English and 
other modern languages. Prepositions can be invented 
when thing and position are differenti ated; preposition.s 
must be invented when recognized relations have so multi-
plied as to exceed the resources of the case scheme. 
From the standpoint of rhetoric, however, the substitu-
tion of prepositions for case-endings is not an unmixed 
good. There is a directness and force about the old expres-
sions which seem somehow to be dissipated when language 
becomes extremely analytic. 
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Analysis of t!te Substantive. 
A.-lt is the sign of a thing. Therefore all that follows 
from being the sign of that which occupies space may be 
attributed to the substantive. 
1. - number (discretion in space), 
a) singular, b) plural, 
2.- case (relation in space), 
a) nominative, b) genitive, c) accusative, 
3.- person, 
a) first, b) second, c) third, 
4.- gender, 
a) masculine, b) feminine, c) neuter. 
Classification of Words belonging to Space-Presentations. 
I. Substantives, 
r .- nouns, or special substantives, 
a) common, 
b) proper, 
2.- pronouns, or general substantives, 




I .-special, red, bold, 
2.-general, or pronominal, 
a) representative, some, 11011e, 




II I. Prepositions 
CHAPTER XVI. 
WORD BELONGI G TO THE CATEGORTE OF TI IE. 
Verb Classes.-The verb expresses the event. erbs are 
of two kinds, substantive verbs, or existence-verbs, and mo-
tion-verbs. The two classes can not be separated by any 
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definite line and several seem to be used sometimes as sub-
stantive verbs and sometimes as motion-verbs. Substantive 
verbs can be determined by all classes of subordinate ele-
ments found in grammar except direct object. Hence i~ 
addition to other verbs, they may be determined by pred1-
catives, genitives, and adjectives. 
Tlte verb; properties.-From its fundamental nature as 
sign of that which continues, the verb has two properties, 
duration and state. These have been quite fully discussed 
under the categories, and in order to be understood, much 
of what properly belongs here, was inserted there. The 
verb has two "durations," aorist and progressive, and three 
"states," potential, actual, and perfect. 
The term "aorist" is taken in honor of the Greek tense of 
that name; but the term "imperfect," could not be adopted, 
as that would have implied an antithesis to the perfect 
tenses. Here the nomenclature of grammar is atrocious. 
The antithetical tenses in Greek are not perfect and imper-
fect, but aorist and imperfect in reference to duration, pre-
sent and perfect in reference to state. Thus, eAvov, I was 
loosing and EAVO'a, I loosed, are antithetical, since one re-
presents the action as continuing or being reiterated for 
some time, while the other expresses nothing about dura-
tion. Again, i\'.voo, I loose, and AiAvJ£a I have loosed, are 
antithetical, one representing a present action, the other a 
present result of some action. In Latin the contrast is be-
tween imperfect and historical perfect on the one hand, and 
between present and logical perfect on the other. Cum 
tra11sieba11t Rlzenum, Ceasar, etc. While they were crossing, 
pro~essivt; Tra11sieru11t Rlzenum, they crossed the Rhine, 
aonst. Tlii shows one contrast, the other is shown in tqe 
following: Transeunt, they cross, an actuality. Transierzmt 
(when ~aken as truly perfect,) they have crossed, a result. 
In English grammar confusion is even worse confounded. If ~h~r~ is anything that the English so-called imperfect is not, 
It is imperfect. It corresponds to the Greek aorist, and the 
Latin historical perfect. The Latin h:i.s but one form for 
the perfect and aorist, and this has unfortunately been 
named perfect, though it is used in the indicative more than 
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nine times as an aorist, for once as a perfect. 
tive languages, French and Spanish, it has 
past definite, which is an aorist tense. 
In the deriva-
produced the 
All "finite" English verbs are aorist in nature, and so is 
the infinitive and the passive participle. The participle in 
-ing is, however, progressive in nature. The Germanic 
languages, in general, have no progressive form for the true 
verb, while the Romance languages and modern Greek have 
such for the past tenses (the imperfect of these languages). 
In English the perfect state is expressed by the perfect 
participle only, and the progressive duration by the so-called 
"present" participle only. All English verbs are aorist, 
since the participles are not classed with the verbs. 
Verbs, predicatum-power.-In order to fulfill its purpose in 
the sentence, the event-word must be endowed with two 
other great classes of properties. One is predication-power, 
or power to demand a subject and unite with it. Under 
predication comes voice, or the manner in which it unites 
with the subject. o complete English verb has the passive 
voice. Only the perfect participle is passive. Person and 
number are also properties of the verb that belong to it only 
because of its relation to the subject. 
Assertion. - This is the most important of the powers of 
the verb. Since infinitives and participles do not share this 
property, they are not here classed a verbs. Mode and 
tense-time depend on assertion. The English has only two 
tenses and two tense-times, the past and the present. The 
French has four tenses, future, pre ent, aorist past, and 
progressive past, and three tense - times, the past, present, 
and future. The Greek has seven tenses, present, "imper-
fect" (progressive past), aorist, perfect, pluperfect, future 
perfect, and future ; but only three tense-time , present, 
past, and future. 
Ad11crb.-Variation i expressed by the adverb. Adverbs 
are cla si fied as follows: 
I .- Special, quickly. 
::?.- General ; 
a) demonstrative, t!tc11, t!tere; 
b) relative, w!tcn, wlzcre; 
c) interrogative, when, w!tere. 
•=-----=----=--.,,.,_----------~~~.....---.._ _________________  
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Conjunctums.-The category of succession is ex~res:ed 
by the conjunction~. They are of two classes, co-ordmatmg 
and subordinating. 




rst. P. am 
Plur. Sing. Plur. 
were are was 
2nd. P. art, are, wast, werl, were, 
3rd. P. is, 





The rest of the verbal paradigm in English is gramma-
tical superstition. 












Classification of French Tenses.-
I. Future, 
II. Present 












PASSE' D E 1 FIN I. 
IMPARFAIT, 
.. ________ _ 
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Classification of Englis!t and German Tenses. 
I. Present, PRESENT. 
I I. Past, IMPERFECT (the so-called). 
Preterit or past are better names for the latter tense. 
Analysis of tlze E11glisli Verbs and tlie verbal properties of 
tlze participials. 
A.-As event-sign, 
I. *of existence (substantive verb), 
II. of motion proper, 
r.-state, 
a) potential (potential verbs), 
b) actual, 
c) perfect (perfect passive part.) 
2.-duration, 
a) aorist, 
b) progressive (participle in ing), 
B.-Predication-power of uniting with a subject. 
I. voice, 
I.-active, 
















•subdivisions 1 and 2 under II belong to both I and II, 
_ 1io........._ ________ _ 
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Classification of words belonging to Time-presentations. 
1.-Verbs, 
!.-substantive verbs, are, become, 
2.-motion-verbs, 













WORD BELO GING TO BOTH THE CATEGOR JES OF SPACE AND 
THE CATEGORIES OF TIME. 
Tlze cltaracteristics of participials.-N ow here is the ordi-
nary grammar less satisfactory than in its treatment of par-
ticiples and infinitives. First, we are told that the verb 
is a word which asserts; and then participles and infinitives 
are pressed into the service as verbs, and chained in gangs 
of two and three to the oars, that the classic triremes of 
conjugations may be filled in all traditional modes, tense.s, 
d ' ' Ill an voices. What a pity there was not a middle v01ce 
Latin! If there had been, sure as night follows day, we 
should have had one in English too, and the youth of the 
land would have been nurtured on stuff like this: I wash 
myself, thou washest thyself, he washes himself, etc., ad 
libitum. Participles and infinitives have been pressed into 
ervice as verbs, though they certainly do not assert, and, 
d ·----------~~~~~------
WORDS BELONGING TO BOTH SPACE AND TIME. !03 
moreover, in spite of the fact that they are used as nouns 
and adjectives. Thus though grammar starts out with the 
declaration that they are verbs, this is soon forgotten and 
they are treated as something else. o the participles are 
the pariahs among words. And perhaps this is caused by 
the fact that they are the hybrids of language, true partici-
ples being hybrids between adjectives and verbs, infinitive 
being hybrids between substantives and verbs. "His 
example warning a world." Here, warning is an adjective 
in relation to example, and a verb in relation to world, the 
latter word being its direct object. That is, wami11g is the 
sign of a quality-presentation in relation to example and of 
a motion - presentation in relation to world. The art of 
thus changing the symbol from one category to another, 
belongs to an advanced stage of thought, and therefore, 
except in a few stereotyped expressions, we seldom hear 
participles used by uncultured persons. vVe shall use the 
term participials to denote with a common name participles, 
infinitives, gerunds, gerundives, and supines, in short, all the 
nominal forms of the verb. These hybrids are of two kinds. 
!.-Substantive Participials. 
2.-Adjective Participials. 
Substantive participials we consider a separate part of 
speech, belonging both to the category of thing and to that of 
event. To all the superordinate elements of the sentence, 
it stands in the relation of a substantive; to all elements 
ubordinate to itself, it stands in the relation of a verb. To 
its co-ordinate element (subject or predicate) it may stand 
in either relation. Ex. "He desired to confuse, not to 
persuade." The infinitives confuse and persuade are direct 
objects of the verb desired, and hence are in relation to that 
verb (its subordinate element) substantives. Ex. "To com-
fort those that were without a comforter, was his mission." 
The infinitive comfort is subject of the verb was, and hence 
a substantive in relation to its co-ordinate element; but it is 
itself determined by the direct object tlzose, and is therefore 
a verb in relation to its subordinate element. Ex. "He 
heard Jenny Lind sing." The infinitive sing is here the 
predicate of :Jenny Lind. (To be a predicate it need not 
• 
104 MORPHOLOGY. 
assert, as it does not do here.) Hence this is an example of 
an infinitive in the relation of a verb to its co-ordinate 
element. 
The substantive participials in English are the infinitive, 
the perfect participle after have, and the participle in -ing 
when used as a substantive but retaining its participial nature. 
That that which is !tad, must be thought as a thing, ought to 
be plain to everybody. "I have loved," means, I possess 
the action of love as a result. " He has eaten," means, he 
possesses eating as a compli::ted action. That the "partici-
ples" loved and eaten are not adjective participials in these 
cases (after have), is easily proved by going to a l anguag~ 
that declines its adjectives even after verbs. French: '7'at 
aime', and Nous m1011s aime', or 'J'eus aime', and Nous eltmes 
aime'. Whether the subject is singular or plural, the form 
of aime' is the same, showing that it is not an adjective in 
nature. The same holds true in the Swedish. And the 
wedish grammarians recognize the difference and call the 
participial after !tave, not a participle, but a supine. When 
the passive participle is used in other combinations, it is an 
adjective participial, as in, "I am loved." Thus, French : 
Ye suis aime', and vous ~tes aime'. Here we notice that the 
participial changes form, as an adjective should. 
The participle in -ing is a substantive participial in con-
tructions like these: "Se!!ing is believing;" " By order-
ing up his infantry, the general," etc. The same forms are, 
plainly, pure nouns when qualified by adjectives, as "Good 
breeding can not be simulated." There is a singular non-
observance of a grammatical principle in the English idiom 
which requires the subject of a participle to be in the genitive 
case. "The news of my going to Paris excited great 
interest," (from a school-grammar). "His embracing the 
Christian religion was used as a pretext," etc. The univer-
sal principle is that subject and predicate unite on equal 
terms and are of equal importance; but the genitive case 
always denotes dependence, subordination. This is one 
instance among many, showing that the unconscious logic 
of language is not absolutely infallible. The Greek lan-
guage permits also a violation of the principle of partici-
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pials. The universal principle is that the elements subord-
inate to a participial are those of the verb; i. e. adverbs, not 
adjectives, are used to determine participials. But the 
Greeks used the definite article, which is an adjective, to 
determine the infinitive. Ex. 'Ev Too xpauiv i<fn ua1 TO 
"A.aµfJanzv ux Trov 17novmv. But a moment's reflection 
will show that the Greek language violates the letter in 
order to obey the spirit of language. The article has here 
no adjective force at all but rather that of a case-ending or 
prepos1t1on. The article is really used to show in what case 
the infinitive is used. The infinitive being indeclinable, 
some means must be invented to denote its relations. Ar-
ticles would never have been used before infinitives by the 
Greeks, if, like the Latins, they had possessed a declined 
substantive participial. Besides, the Greek language has a 
supreme contempt for the rules of mere formal logic, and 
often violates these in order to satisfy the deeper instincts 
of thought. For example, the double negative, the singular 
verb with a plural neuter subject, and the nominative with 
the infinitive. 
Tlie adjedive participials might also have been called 
simply participles, but for the sake of symmetry we shall 
retain the longer term, though still taking the liberty of 
using the shorter when we see fit. English has two partici-
ples, 
a) The perfect passive participle. This participial form 
is always an adjective participial, except when used as the 
object of lzave, when it is here called a supine. 
b) The actual active progressive participle. This is the 
participle in-ing. It is not present; no participials denote 
time; "a whistling bird,'' may refer to one that whistled to-
day or whistled a thousand years ago. But the participle 
can denote state, and the state denoted here is the actual; 
the act denoted by the participle was at the time of the 
proposition actualizing itself. It is active, because it repre-
sents its subjects as having the relation of agent. And, final-
ly, it is progressive, since it denotes the act as something 
going on for some time. As the verbs are all active and 




which avoids nothing so carefully as a superfluity of gram-
matical forms. The progressive nature of this participle, . 
though always present, is not emphasized except in certain 
constructions. 
Classification of tlte Englislt Participials. 
I .-substantive partici pials, 
a) supines, he has ruled, 
b) gerunds, by suffering ills, he etc., 
c) infinitives. 
2.-adjective participials, 
a) perfect passive participles, 
b) actual active progressive participles. 
Ordinarily, in referring to the participles, we shall call 
them the passive and the active participles. 
Classification of tlze Latin lzybrid words. 
I.-su bstantive partici pials, 
a) supines, 
b) gerunds, 
c) actual infinitives, amare, 
d) perfect infinitives, amavisse. 
2.-adjective participials, 
a) perfect passive participles, 
b) actual active participles, 
c) .Potential passive participles, or gerundives. 
Analysis of Participials. 
A. Verbal properties, 
I. event-( or duration )sign, 
) I.-as exi~tence, being, becoming, { 
( 2.-as mo~10n proper, ) * 
a) state, 
aa) potential, futurus, or 
bb) actual, ruling, or 
cc) perfect, ruled, 
b) duration, 
aa) aorist, or 
bb) progressive, 
bdo:8;~~\;~~i~C~J <:i!/c~1. (b) (state and duration) under "verbal properties" 
-------------~-
WORDS BELONGING TO BOTH SPACE AND TIME. 107 
II. predication power, 
1.-voice, 
B. Adjective properties (of adjective participials ), 
I. · gender, 
II. number, 
III. case, 
C. Substantive properties (of substantive participials), 
I. case. 
Classes of Words or Parts of Speeclt. 
A. Words belonging to space, 
I. Substantives, 
I .-nouns or special substantives, 
2.- pronouns or general substantives. 
II. Ad_jicti.ves, 
1 .-special, 
2.-general, or pronominal. 
I II. Prepositions. 








C. Words belonging to both time and space (English). 




VI 11. Adjective Participials, 





A ALYSIS OF VERBAL PHRASES. 
A systematic treatise of syntax is found in conjunction 
with dynamics in Part III. We have already explained why 
this arrangement seemed preferable to deferring the discus-
sion of syntax to its proper part. But we have a v~ry 
important portion of the science of sentence-construct10n 
left, which could not be discussed before morphology was 
settled. This portion consists of the so-called "compound 
verbs," or "verb phras~s." 
Every sentence expresses an event, and events, as we 
have seen, differ in temporal properties, as to tense-tim~, 
state, duration. A portion of this wealth of time-determi-
nations is expressed by the verb itself, and has accordingly 
been considered under morphology. The rest is expressed 
by combinations of words, and belongs to syntax. 
Tlze syntax of the "Primary symbol"* of eve11ts.-The primary 
symbol of English has never any future to account for. The 
verbs may, can, must, need, slzall, and will do not express 
future actions, like the Latin and Greek future tenses. They 
express a present potentiality. Thus, in I must go, must 
expresses an actual condition of the subject. The subject's 
present existence is ?IOUJ such that going will result. In I 
slzall go, neither the verb- shall nor the combination shall go ~ as the primary symbol a presentation of a future 
•For meaning of the term "primary symbol" see Teleologic econo1n11. 
[108] 
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action. S!tall go = a present necessity for going. (at some 
time). 
The primary symbol of English thought has, therefore, 
only two tense-times, present and past. The tense-times are 
expressed by the verb directly. The perfect event (event 
as a result) is expressed by !tave with a perfect participle as 
its direct object. No doubt the possession expressed by 
lzave is actual, but the event expressed by the perfect parti-
ciple is perfect (a result). Hence the two together assert 
primarily a "perfect" event. 
All English verbs are aorist (that is, unlimited as to 
duration), but, by asserting existence by the verb is (to be) 
and adding as an attribute a progressive participle, we can 
assert as primary symbol a progressive existence. Ex. The 
roses are blooming. 
No English verb is passive, but by the aid of a substan-
tive verb ("to be," &c.) determined by the perfect passive 
participle as its attribute, we assert events as passive in 
relation to the subject. 
Kinds of primary event-symbols in Englislz.- (The active 





a) aorist, sees. 
b) progressive, ts seemg. 
2.-perfect, 
a) aorist, lzas seen. 
b) progressive, lzas been seeing. 
3.-poten ti al, 
a) aorist, will see. 
b) progressive, will be seeing. 
Past, 
r.-actual, 
a) aorist, saw. 
b) progressive, was seeing. 
2.-perfect, 
a) aorist, lzad seen. 
b) progressive, lzad been seeing. 
3.-potential, 
a) aorist, would see. 
b) progressive, would be seeing. 
I IO SYNTAX. 
Kinds of primary event-symbols in the Spanish. (Active.) 
I. Future, 
1.-actual, aorist ( "futuro"), hablara. 
2.-perfect, aorist ("futuro anterior"), lzabra 
lzablado. 
I I. Present, 
!.- actual, aorist ( "presente"), habla. 
2.- perfect, aorist ( "perfecte" ), ha hablado. 
III. Past, 
1.- actual, 
a) aorist ("preterito perfecto definido"), ltablo. 
b) progressive ("imperfecto"), hablaba. 
2.- perfect, 
a) aorist ( "preterito anterior"), ltubo lzablado. 
b) progressive ("pluscuam perfecto") lzabia 
ltablado. 
The French has the same scheme. Only symbols ex-
pressible with combinations of verbs and partici pials are 
here noted; with the aid of adverbs and other circumlocu-
tions an almost interminable number of shades of temporal 
and predicative differences can be expressed. 
The secondary symbol is the symbol by which the listener 
to speech chooses to symbolize the thought ·after he has 
comprehended the symbol constructed by the speaker. It 
is often not the same as the primary symbol. When the 
primary is very artificial or involved, a simpler symbol is 
generally substituted as secondary. These, naturally, vary 
with each individual, but as different minds still follow in 
the main the same course in thinking, these symbols could 
be at least approximately systematized. If written out, 
these symbols would form a table somewhat approximating 
what is now called "conjugation" of the verb. This table 
would be of little use, however, except in comparing the 





A SYSTEM OF DIAGRAMS. 
To save the reader time ano trouble in following our 
analysis, the following system of diagrams should be used 
to show the relation of words in the sentence: 
(Apposition) subject pred. verb (predicative, or "pred. noun.') 
I adj. to appos. genitive object. adv. to verb. direct ob.ect 
adj. to subj. 
adv. to adj. I 
I 




I obj. to dir. obj. 
indirect ob·. 
I adj. to ind. obj. 
circumstantial ob·. 
If no direct or indirect object is found, two "rudiment-
ary" lines are left to indicate this, and thus show the rank 
of the objects found, thus; " He is worth a million." 
He IS He is 
or ~F-m11lion, 
I~ 
(Either of these analyses can be defended.) 
[111) 
112 APPLICATION. 
Adjectives are joined to the n'ght of a perpendicular line, 
under the middle of the word limited (" modified"). Ad-
verbs are joined to the left of the same line. " Motion-
objects" (all except genitives and prepositional objects 
"modifying" nouns), are joined to perpendicular line near 
the n'gltt extremity of the word determined. Objects of 
nouns are joined to a line near the left extremity. . 
Propositions related as propositions are connected with 
dotted lines ; co-ordinate propositions occupy the same 
level, subordinate propositions are placed below the element 
determined (modified). 
but ~·-······················· ··· ··· ·· ·· ····· · ·············· · ······························ -············· ·· i i 
Man i proposes God i disposes. 
I I fear 
they I are 
_.,, .... ·· i I 




he i is 
nigh I 
Relatives. 
_./ !, ~ 
,....... . ......... -................................................................ _, ........... ~~~1 
w b;· I put others j tremble 
trust 
s· I their 
Lord 
the 
Relatives, when determining a word in the dependent 
clause also, are put above the determined word in the de-
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To simplify diagramming, relative adjectives, when the 
substantives to which they refer are not expressed, are 
allowed to take the places of said substantives. 
CHAPTER XX. 
ANALYSIS OF DISPUTED CONSTRUCTIONS. 
We shall now turn our attention to disputed construc-
tions. First to be considered are the so-called compound 
tenses of the verb. 
Tlie "passive voice."-
! 1 am lb I Jam 
I I happy. 
The syntax of these two sentences is the same. Am is in 
both the predicate, and loved in the one and lzappy in the 
other are attributes qualifying the substantive verb am. 
There is nothing passive about the verb ; it is in the indica-
tive present, and can not be said to be either active or 
passive, since it represents being. Loved being an adjective 
participial, indicates the word modified as its subject. This 
is am, but the being in am is the same as that of I, hence it 
is implied that the subject of loved is I. Loved is truly 
passive, as it represents its implied subject as passive. 
Tiu "perfect tenses."-
I , have 
-r--i I bread. 




1 I happiness. 
Nell 1 had ell 1 had 
I little I death. I tittle \ died 
The direct objects of the verbs are eaten, bread, loved, 
lzappiness, died, death, alternately substantives and substantive 
participials. The similarity is apparent. We claim that the 
-------= 
~ -
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perfect participle after ltave is always the direct object of 
have. Assuredly there is nothing unwarranted in this as-
sumption. Have is certainly a transitive verb, and not only 
may take an object, but requires one. Substantive participi-
als are often used as direct objects, as all grammars teach. 
That the participial after ltave is a substantive participial is 
apparent. In languages that inflect the adjective participials 
even after verbs, the participial after have always remains 
uninflected, as in Spanish, French, and Swedish . In modern 
Greek, the participials that follow have (exw) to form the 
so-called perfect tenses is the infinitive, which indisputably 
is a substantive participial. In the popular language, a form 
derived from the participial is also used, but this is unin-
flected and ends in a, as Tor exw iowµera, I have seen 
him. 
The constructions denominated perfect tenses have de-
veloped from expressions of this kind. "The tiger which I 
keep (have) imprisoned." "He has a written letter." "He 
has the letter written." "The letter he has (keeps) written. " 
M d G k 'H , ' ' ' ' ' " ' o ern ree : E7CZC1TOl\.Tf TTf'V 07tozar EZXa ypaµµer17r. 
"The king has a prisoner chained to the wall." It will be 
noticed in these examples, that in every case the participial . 
qualifies the object of ltave, as an adjective, and is accord-
ingly an adjective participial. But on one great day in the 
history of modern tongues, the genius of language meta-
morphosed the whole construction into a new creature. 
The center of gravity of the old construction lay in the 
substantive used as object, the participial was but a deter-
mination. "The king had the prisoner chained." What 
sort of a prisoner? A chained prisoner. After the meta-
morphosis, the center of gravity rests with the participial. 
Below are diagrams of the two constructions. 
The king has the prisoner chained, and The king has 
chained the prisoner. ' 
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Tlze ''future tenses" and tlte "potential mode."-
She I can 
I 
She I is 
I able 
---, to-sing. 
The relation between can and sing is one on which 
English grammarians are as silent as if it were the esoteric 
doctrine of a sacred mystery; but the amusing feature about 
it is, that generally it has been taken for granted that can 
and sing are but one word. And then, when in a general way 
the fact that a pair makes two is recognized, the true verb, 
the most important word of the sentence, is called an 
auxiliary. 
In the first example, subject, size; predicate-verb, can; 
circumstantial object, the infinitive sing. The second sen-
tence is very similar and shows the correctness of the 
former analysis. Subj., site,· pred., is; attribute of predicate, 
able; circumstantial object of able, the infinitive, to sing. 
To is here no proper word ; it is only the sign of the 
infinitive, and may consequently be considered as a part of 
the infinitive, thus, to-sing. In the last sentence it is an open 
question whether or not the infinitive to sing ought to be 
considered as a circumstantial object of the verb is, instead 
of its subordinate element able. In this case, however, we 
follow tradition, and this the more calmly, as it seems to us 
that in the present instance it is not the meaning of the verb 
at all, but the sense of the adjective able that is determined. 
We J may 
Psucceed. 
OU I is 
~1 : permitted 









It will be noticed that the verb may has several mean-
ings. In the first example may means subjective possibility; 
as far as the speaker knew the conditions of the real world, 
there was no insurmountable obstacle ; but in the second 
problem, may denotes permission, a part of objective poten-
tiality. 
necessity I will 
I that I l~rise they shall J=;;onquer 
·l I world I I the. 
future 
some 
In neither of these cases do we primarily assert a further 
action. For, to be exact, we assert and predicate no action 
at all, but a potentiality, that is, a state. The potentialit~, 
moreover, is present in tense. It is now that the necessity 
will and they sltall. Such is their present condition that the 
action (arise, conquer) is sure to come. As has been shown 
before, all present tenses in English are also futures. The 
potentiality is by no means limited to the present time only. 
But the action that as an object limits the potentiality can, 
by the very nature of the case, not very well be anythi?g 
ex~~pt future action, though nothing in the form of the 10,~ 
finitive does so indicate. "They shall conquer the world, 
'.11eans they possess a present potentiality which must result 
in ~he conquest of the world; or, they are in a state from 
which conquest of the world follows. 
Where, indeed, is the future of the future tense? Which 
of the two following is more future? ,., He will strike, He 
must strike." 
We shall now attack some of the more complex phrases, 
though their solution follows from what has been already given. 
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ANALYSIS OF DISPUTED CONSTRUCTIONS. I 17 
That is, he possesses a being that has the attribute of being 
loved. But, it might be objected, that this being might be, 
say, his wife's not his own being. So it might, if been were 
a substantive, but being a participial it must have a subject; 
the implied subject of been is, as is usual with participials, 
the subject of the sentence. It is accordingly expressed 
that the being in question is the subject's own, and it might 
be paraphrased thus : he possesses his own being as quali-








Subj., lu; pred., will; circumstantial object of will, !tave 
been ruled; direct object of !tave, been ruled; attribute of 
been, ruled. 
Experience 1 shall 
~ave 
---1 tried 
I I you. 
Circumstantial object o( s!tall, !tave tried you; direct ob· 
ject of !tave, tried you; direct object of tried, you. 
Some German "compound verbs," which differ from the 
English, may be profitably considered. 
\ gewandert 
Ich I babe 1 
I geliebt 
Ich bin 
The two constructions are not identical. Gewandert is 
a perfect participle, that is, an adjective participial and 




substantive participial, and limits habe as a direct object. 
Ich J werde 
I \= lieben 
Ich J werde 
I I= . 





Ich I werde 
I \= sein 
Two rd en 
·I geliebt. 
These represent the true grammatical relations. In the 
last sentence, for example, sein is related only to werde and 
worden, and to the one as a determination, but to the other 
as a word to be determined. 





1 I amaturus 
X 1 sum iri 
-+-, -.,..\ -a-mandus \~matum. 
In the three sentences above the existence of ego is as-
serted. This is limited in the first by qualifying it by the 
attribute of an action existing as result. The participle is 
passive and expresses that its implied subject (ego) is joined 
to it passively. Amaturus qualifies sum by the attribute of 
an action existing as a potentiality, which is also the case 
with amandus. The difference is, that one is active, the 
other passive. 
Modem Greek ' represents many peculiarities, as it uses 
real modal and temporal particles instead of auxiliaries. 
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I may loose, Na_i\.vw. 
x , i\.vw 
I I I 
va 1 
Na may also be considered a conjunction. But the 
"perfect," I have loosed, l'xw i\.v<YEz. 
x l'x_w 
I 1 i\.v<YEz 
The same construction is found in the last example as in 







The fundamental thought of this thesis is that grammar 
is not only a science but also a branch of philosophy. Every 
case-ending, every mode and tense, the rules of syntax and 
their seeming exceptions can be traced back ultimately to 
the laws of the human mind. The laws on which speech 
finally depends are the laws of perception and imagination, 
and only mediately the laws of the concept and judgment. 
The same inflexible laws of time and space which govern 
· the phenomena of perception, also govern the forms and 
rules of speech. Here on the very threshold of our investi-
gation we encounter an arch heresy. Attempts have been 
made to apply the laws of logic to speech. Many logicians 
do not even stop to notice whether the problems they inves-
tigate are verbal or conceptual. This confusion of language 
and logic, favored as it is by the very etymology of the 
word logic, has vitiated the principles of both. For a 
greater mistake can not be made in grammar, than to as-
sume that the laws of the concept apply directly to lan-
guage. Having established this fundamental principle, that 
the laws of grammar are based on the nature of the world of 
presentations, we have attempted to show in detail the un-
broken connection with the fundamental principle into the 
[120] 
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uttermost ramifications of inflections and syntax. The re-
sults of the inquiry into the fundamental logical and psy-
chological laws of language, is embodied in the nomencla-
ture adopted. Every term implies a theory. For the trained 
mind, the use of terms like "category of time," "determina-
tion by location," and "thing- presentation," ought to be 
sufficient to indicate the way back to psychological head-
quarter-; from the utmost outposts of grammatical excep-
tions. Our subject possesses a grand philosophical unity 
and continuity which knows of no hiatus from the beginning 
of psychology to the end of grammar, and it has been our 
aim to indicate this unity as fully as possible. 
At the very foundation of our system lies the distinction 
between symbol and meaning. \Ve agree here to a certain 
extent \\ith the English logicians, F. H. Bradley and B. 
Bosanquet. Their doctrines of symbol and meaning, though 
all that is necessary for tluir purposes, are not quite sufficient 
for our investigations. ymbols belong to the world of 
time and space only, meaning to the realm of concepts. 
The world of time and space includes memory, imagination 
and perception. Its content are presentations. There is 
no difference between presentations, so far as the laws of 
time and space, and, con equently, the laws of symbolism, 
are concerned. The symbol is never the meaning; the 
meaning (or concept) 1s never known except in and through 
a symbol. This i a pair of most vital principles. everal 
thinkers of note eem, ho\\e\·er, to hold views somewhat con-
flicting with this. \\'m. \ allace, in the Preface to hi trans-
lation of Hegel's Logic, seems to oppo e pictorial thought 
to pure thought. The same is noticed in the writings of Dr. 
\\. T. Harri . How far the ·e acute thinkers wish to be 
construed in a manner that fir·t suggests itself to the ordi-
nary reader, i · hard to determine. We still hope that they 
hold with us that "pure thought" consists in a clear con-
sciou ness of the mere symbolic value of images in thought, 
and not in a proce. s of thinking that is emancipated from 
all temporal and spatial symbols. The other principle, that 
the symbol is never the meaning, eems to be contradicted 
by F. H. Bradley, as has been noticed before. Other ex-
-·:>ce page 9, Principles of Logic. 
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pressions of his seem to agree with our view. It is only fair 
to state, that to all these thinkers the question of the 
relation of symbol and meaning is only of secondary im-
portance, and is hence treated rather incid entally. 
In Part Second, the laws of the presentation-world in 
reference to symbolism, and their connection with the 
classes and properties of words, are investigated. Here we 
move in the realm of images and percepts, but must take 
notice of the laws of the conceptual world in so far as these 
laws affect the use of images and percepts as symbols. 
The doctrine of the inclusiveness of time and the exclu-
siveness of space is a principle of great importance, not only 
in the symbolism of language, but in all departments of 
philosophy. A misunderstanding must be guarded against. 
By saying that time is the form of continuity, or unity, it is 
not affirmed that time itself may not be conceived as a 
succession of discreet moments; and by asserting that spa~e 
is the form of particularity, plurality, it is not said th~t 
space itself may not be thought as a continuum. What is 
affirmed concerns the contents of time and space. We can 
not help thinking that the contents of time to-day are the 
same as of yesterday. The world may look different but 
"in reality" it is the same, we say. The laws of the conser-
vation of energy and the indestructibility of matter are 
simply explicit statements of this fundamental character of 
time. Sir Wm. Hamilton's law of the condition, Kant's 
causality, and Hegel's second stage of thought are all mo:e 
or less happy attempts to express this principle of time in 
relation to the human mind. But on the contrary, it is also 
impossible to believe that two portions of space, however 
minute and however close together, can contain the same 
particle of matter . This is what is meant by the exclusive-
ness of space. How beautifully this explains the facts of 
grammar, is easily shown when it appears that number an_d 
case can be deduced directly from the exclusion of space i~ 
the category of things; and when it is shown that the "state 
and "duration" of the verb come directly from the inclusive-
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There is a beautiful symmetry and correspondence be-
tween the two sets of categories. Thing and event, quality 
and manner, position and succession, are at once the coun-
terparts and complements of each other. The first catego-
ries of time and space are the simplest, most natural and 
direct. The last pair is more artificial, being an application 
of the laws of the opposite fundamental form, just as the 
laws of space applied to time by the category of succes-
sion. 
From a practical point of view, the most important 
results in Parts 11-IV are found in the treatment of the 
verb. Two new properties are discovered, state and dura-
tion ; the pure time distinctions are reduced to three, and in 
the case of the English to two, pa t and present; participles 
and infinitives are eparated from verbs and e tablished as 
new classes co-ordinate with the other parts of speech ; 
predication and assertion are di tinguished, and true tense 
and mode referred to the latter; all the properties of the 
verb are referred to the fundamental properties of assertion, 
predication, and representation of event . Other "practical" 
re ult are the dis-e tablishment of the article as a separate 
part of peech ; the cla sing together of noun and pronouns 
as a new part of speech, sub tantives; and the revolution-
ized doctrine of cases as treated from the tandpoint of the 
category of position. The treatment of participials is al o 
of a radical character. ttempts have been made to show 
how all these result are reached by a trict application of 
the fundamental principle previously established. 
Grammar a u ual\y taught confu e verbal predication 
and logical judgment. This is an unavoidable error o long 
a ymbol and meaning are not differentiated. Predication 
has to do with the symbol, and con ist in ignifying by 
word the joining of an event-presentation with a presenta-
tion of thing. ssertion is the appearance of the logical 
judgment in the sphere of language. These subjects are 
treated at the beginning of Part Third (Chapters IX and 
X). \ hile the ordinary school logics disagree\ ith us, we 
are happy to state that, as far as they go into the question, 
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we can claim kinship in these doctrines with men like F. H. 
Bradley and B. Bosanquet. 
Of special importance is the treatment of the substantive 
verb. This has a certain kinship with the substantive, be-
cause of the fact that its category (existence ) can also be 
used as a higher expression of the category of substantives 
(things). Therefore we claim that the substantive used 
after the substantive verb is in the relation of an appositiv~ 
to the verb. The term predicative has been invented to 
express this element. The adjective that occurs in the 
predicate with substantive verbs is an attribute of the verb 
in the same manner as other adjectives are attributes of sub-
stantives. 
The treatment of objects in syntax should be noticed as 
an example of how directly and decisively the laws of the 
categories decide the principles of syntax. That all partici-
ples must have subjects; the distinction between a predict 
· and a proposition; the principles that inside the proposition 
there is no time, that words determine according to spatial 
laws and propositions according to temporal laws, are some 
of the more important results that differ from accepted 
syntax. 
The guiding conceµtion in this thesis is that grammar, in 
order to be a science, must be based on a philosophy. This 
is decidedly out of the trend of nineteenth century thought, 
but we may venture the prediction that it will i;iot be so far 
from the main channel of thinking in the twentieth century. 
The thought of to-day is dazzled by the success of the 
evolutionary treatment of biology; and history of develop-
ment is the alpha and omega of wisdom to the thinkers that 
follow the fashion of the hour. Many a wily philosopher 
has, accordingly, simply coated his potent pills of thought 
with a thin shell of history, as he knew this to be the only 
way to make the learned mob notice his theories. Thus, we 
?et h~storical schools in political science, historical phonetics 
in philology, history of philosophy in place of philosophy, 
and have even come so far as to hold that an examination 
of the manner in which, historically, conceptions of right 
conduct enter human thought is the sum-total of ethics ! 
_,.......__) --~-----
SU'.\!MARY. 125 
Be it far from us to deny that the enthusiasm for historical 
study has thrown an invaluable light on every department 
of knowledge; but still, it is the duty of the independent 
thinker to recognize the limitations of every method, and to 
be fettered by none. Historical philology has accomplished 
much, and more may be in store for it in the future; but 
it never will di cover any substitute for the philosophical 
foundations of the science of language ; for these founda-
tions are not phenomena of history, they are above and 
beyond history, they are the logical and psychological laws 
of consciousness itself. 
